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PREFACE
The last war was "the war that shall end war.
In the light of events occurring at the present time, it
is impossible to accept that statement without some ques-
tioning. There is grave doubt as to whether or not the
human race has passed through that stupendous final ex-
perience. We may hope so and act to insure a realization
of this hope; but "until the great majority of mankind
has been educated into the true principles of democracy,
until each has grown to say in his heart that he wants
the same rights and opportunities as his neighbor, and no
more, war is a possibility." (1) For this reason, the
problem of war finance will alv;ays be of great Importance.
(1) Red Book of the World War , page 30.
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iIntroduction ,
Public finance deals with the revenues of govern-
ment, v/ith their expenditure, and their administration.
The state pays for its normal expenditures by the proceeds
of taxation. The individual citizens are required to con-
tribute money to the government in return for being
governed. The taxes paid from part of the "consumer's
outlay" of the taxpayer. The funds thus gathered are
spent by the government as state business demands. When
they are paid out to government employees and the pro-
ducers of those essentials which the government bought,
the funds go into "consumer's Income". If the income and
expenditure of the government are equal, the correspond-
ing items in "consumer's Income" and "consumer's outlay"
taken as a whole unit balance; we have then a balanced
budget. But, even if income and expenditure are ultimately
equal, the proceeds of taxes cannot always be expected to
come in exactly as they are needed. There will be dis-
crepancies and the government will have to borrov/ to equal-
ize the balances. Sometimes the borrowing will be permanent.
When the government finds it necessary to borrow,
it uses the same sources that the business man turns to
when funds are necessary. A government's temporary bor-
rowings will be from banks and discount houses; its
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permanent borrov/ings will come from the genuine savings
of the community.
As long as the government raises money by taxation
and by loans which come from the genuine savings of the
people; as long as its temporary borrowings are discharged
by the proceeds of taxation, it is follov/ing the same pro-
cedure as the business man only on a larger scale.
The situation is different if a nation finds it-
self suddenly catapulted into a state of war. Government
needs increase suddenly and so do expenditures. The
government’s problem is to secure the necessary amount of
purchasing power as quickly as possible. The government,
moreover, has to divert to its own uses a correspondingly
increased portion of the productive resources of the land.
If, as in peacetime, it were able to raise the requisite
funds by taxation and borrov;lng in the home market (from
genuine savings^, this diminution in public expenditure
would so reduce the demand for commodities as to set free
all the labor and capital needed for war purposes.
To secure the great amount of funds necessary
for war purposes is the field of war finance. Using the
definition of "public finance" a definition of "war finance"
may be built up. "War finance deals with the revenue of
(1) The discussion in the first few paragraphs is based
on pages 25 to 50 of Hav/trey's book. Currency and
Credit
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government, with their expenditure, and their administration
during a period of conflict.” During a period of v/ar, or-
dinary means are of no avail, the tools are the same as
during a normal period, hut since their utilization is more
intensive, the results of such utilization may have pov/er-
ful economic and social results. In general, there are
three ways in which purchasing power may he raised, two
having heen already mentioned above, namely taxation and
borrowing. By borrowing we mean the sale of long-term
and short term interest-bearing promises- to-pay. The third
method is by issuing non-interest-bearing promises-to-pay
and putting them into circulation as money.
The plan to be followed in the thesis is as
follows: first, the facts of taxation, borrov/lng, and
paper money during the Revolutionary, Civil, and World
Wars will be set down; from the facts deductions will be
made with an eye towards establishing maxims of sound war
finance
Hi
J
f
f 1*7#^ ^c> A gr.l'ryC *• Ito ^oinfftcr-iS ^iWf>
Bs rUT' s-ts aloe:? ,IXiiVj3 on to
''' '
•
''.
‘’’
i^
a^oc 2 l oon^a tifo
,
6oi'fe<| loE^pn 4 rKtit^b
M
-xaisroqi evAff tusi^ASllI^U bouw to aXIuaei &iSir .eTlBn^trri
ij'iA .Xp'xsfTs-j nS .SsiTIl^ost "lAioo# Jbftii oXnonooa Iix^
oirt
^
4l)eaiJi'? 9<f-teff 'iewoq rtX 9Xsm
tiol^AXQ^ ,iivo<fA !>t»noi>rn&» tt^ad
»irsa:f -r^ocX to ^l£.3 arsjfiy /wcoi uaXipt^^Oif ^ .’gifXyooTXod
bitiii sjfJ^ .Y;30-o;t-fi9ai»o^q (htorfc db/iA
- > ' J:
r
ai 6od:^efli
.^i^aora a ft Doi.^aZt/o'jXc cd'itX «9xfJ bna
t i
an el
€M6aX aii? ni oovfoJXot *'<if os /jelq silT ^ ' ,
i*:-.
"
'"
ii
J>iiA ^^J:^(yl*Tc^ ^nol^.nxAS te s^’oat. 5>£f^ ,ullrtlt ;s»oilo^ *
-,
•
'I'.
MnoW fion... ^XlrtO tX^CBOOltJb'Iov^ 9iiJ X^fjoin -
$<i Illw enoX^fcoub^fc eXf^nt oxW' efTSt ;nw6fc laa ©d Xliw
“N
'Xi 6if£fq5 to eciieffl ^iiS£ti?J>icfaS&^ slrrewd? s^Ci? cub ^iXlw eiwiffi
*./*
'
i .eadftftit
If •
* 111 # r
-£;.-,
« V i *w1l
*'. --
CHAPTER I
TAXATION
Taxation during: Revolutionary V/pr ,
The first Continental Congr^^ss which met September
.5
,
1774, contented itself mainly with public addresses. Open
warfare did not begin until the following spring. At -^irst,
the organization o"^ the militia and the burden of its supnort
were borne by the sev-^ral colonies. Not until June, 1775, did
Congress order the raising of an American continental array.
This was followed in September by legislation for fitting out
a navy. The supervision of the frontier Indians and the
administration of the post o-^fice w'^re also add‘=‘d to the
duties of Congress. For the carrying out of these increased
duties revenues vrere needed.
The proceeds of taxation during the Revolutionary
7ar v;ere very inadepuat''. Due to the chaotic conditions ex-
isting at the time, it is difficult to determine the exact
amount raised by taxation. From such data as are available,
v/e can estimate that the income of the Continental Congress,
from 1775 to 17^5, measured in specie was ov=»r 1^4,003,000.
Of this total only a little over 15,000,000 v/as the result
of taxing activities. (I)
(1) Dewey, R.D.
,
Financial History of the United States, Rage '^0.

To supply the treasury with funds the Continental
Congress asked the various States to contribute fixed sums.
Such requests were but feebly honored. VJhat was accomplished
by the mild methods of requisition, or assessment of taxa-
tion on the States, may easily be described. Beginning
with November, 1777, requisition follov/ed requisition vary-
ing in amount and method-of payment. The States did not
meet the demands even with paper money. Between November
22, 1777 and October 6, 1779, there v/ere four requisitions
calling for |;95,000, 000 in paper money, but the payments
in these amounted to only $54,000,000. The three specie
requisitions amounting in all to $11,000,000 yielded only
$1,590,000. (1) In 1780 resort was had to a demand on the
States for specific supplies of corn, beef, pork, rum, and
hay. Some of these requisitions provided that paper money
might be substituted for the specific supplies. Since there
was no well-organized plan of assessment, there was much
inefficiency and waste.
In 1781, an attempt was made to give Congress more
financial pov/er by means of the Articles of Confederation
which were passed at that time. The provision relating to
taxation is as follows :-
"All expenses for the common defense or general
welfare shall be defrayed out of a common treasury supplied
(1) Records of the Rebellion, Vol, 2, page 30
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by the several States in proportion to th<=- value or ipnd
and ioiprovements
;
the taxes to be levied under State
a uthority .
"
This instrument for national ^^ovemment brought
little succor to the treasury. It vasn't until 173? that
Congress was given the pow^^r to tax. Congress received
the power of taxation through provisions in the Constitution
of the United States drafted and accented bj?- the States
in 1737 .
In financing the vrar with "England the coloni'=‘S
v.-ere at a distinct disadvantage since the Continental Congress
and such governmental machinery as existed had no pov'^^rs
of collection. The d if ;Pici.ilt i-^s o^ laying ad<=ruat<^
taxation under the then existing plan of con^ed'^rat
e
government were many. The States refused to grant such-
power to the government, for to do so, meant that thev
must abdicate their privil'^g‘=» o"^ s^lf-taxat ion ^njoy-^d as
colonies. Associated in a struggle against what was t'=rm'^d
unlav/ful taxation", the colon^^s shov;<=d no disnosition
to entrust tlie pow^r of taxation to a body of delogpt pc^
whose authority did not rest on any constitution ^''h-^tso<='V“r
.
Another difPiculty which militated against la 3ring ader-uat®
taxation was th'= simnle nature of the tawing systems in
.
(I)
‘
'
local operation. These systems wpre designed for peace-
time expenditure onl^r; their dev^^lonment in time o'^ v'ar,
when there was partial occupation of
(I) Dewey, R.
,
financial History o:^ the United States, Pag^ 32.
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territory by the enemy, would have been extremely difficult.
Whether the States could have raised by direct
taxation methods sufficient supplies for the current needs
of war, is a question Impossible to decide. We may say,
however, that were taxation a possibility for the Continental
Congress, the financing of the Revolutionary War would have
been much easier.
The system of requisitions proved a failure be-
cause it lacked any well-ordered plan of assessment, and
Congress had no powers of compulsion. Though requisitioning
proved a failure during the Revolutionary War, that is no
proof of its not being applicable in the future were the
emergency ' necessitating its use to arise. If the
United States were to find Itself engaged in some serious
conflict at some future time, it may find requisitioning,
both of money and of goods, a source of supply not to be
scorned.
The attempt to strengthen the taxing position of
Congress by passage of the Articles of Confederation was a
failure. Though most everybody realized at the time that
Congress must have some sources of funds, nobody v/as will-
ing to surrender power over those sources to Congress. The
Articles provided the mode in which the treasury should be
supplied, for the reimbursement of public credit, but the
means were withheld. Thirteen independent legislatures

- 5-
granted or withheld the means according to their own con-
venience.
From the review of taxation during the Revolution-
ary War, we can derive very little help for constructing a
sound system of war finance to be used in the future should
the occasion arise necessitating the utilization of such a
system. At the time of the Rebellion, America was not pre-
pared to solve its tax problem. The situation during the
Civil and World Wars was radically different from that
of Revolutionary times, in that, our government was strongly
centralized, and its power to tax was not disputed.
Therefore, since taxation as a source of funds
was closed to the Continental Congress, it was at a serious
disadvantage in its financing activities. A truly bounti-
ful stream of funds was dammed up, as an examination of
the Civil and World wars will reveal. Another conclusion
which may be drawn is that if any government hopes to be
successful in its war finance activities, it must be
strongly centralized and its power to tax must be un-
questioned.
Taxation during the Civil War.
The result of the elections of November, 1860,
gave a severe shock to public and private credit. Southern
banks withdrew large amounts of money on deposit in North-
ern banks, loans were contracted, and by the middle of the
month the panic was complete. This state of affairs
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seriously affected the revenues of the government. Some-
thing had to he done to replenish the treasury. The
Morril tariff was passed in the same year. Nevertheless,
v/hen the new administration of Lincoln entered upon its
difficult task on March 4, it found the treasury prac-
tically empty. Customs receipts were at a standstill.
The unsatisfactory condition of the treasury is all the
more striking in view of the fact that in the year of
1860 the nation was in excellent economic and material
condition. The consuming power of the people had never
been so high; there was little pauperism; and wealth,
on the whole, was evenly distributed. (1)
The political storm burst on the country with
startling rapidity: the South Carolina Ordinance of
Secession came December 20, 1860; the Confederacy was
formed February 4, 1861; the Civil War began v;ith the
firing on Fort Sumter on April 11; the President called
for troops April 15.
During the four years that followed, one of
the most serious concerns of the government was its
public finance. For Secretary of the Treasury Lincoln
chose Salmon P. Chase of Ohio. “Chase's experience in
public finance was small and his previous political
(1) Hockett, J.
,
Political and Social History of the U.S .
Page 202.
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Ir
career had never called for a thorough consideration of
( 1 )
treasury problems. V/hen Congress met in special session
July 4, 1861, Chase was ready to propose financial measures.
He estimated that the sum needed for next year would not
fall below ^320,000,000. To provide for the ordianry ex-
penditures, for the interest on the public debt to be creat-
ed, and for a sinking fund to be established, Chase recom-
mended that ^80,000,000 be raised by taxation. He urged
no great developments in the existing tax system. He re-
commended that duties be placed on tea, coffee, and sugar.
Congress did not respond so energetically to his recommend-
ations. A few amendments were made to the Morril tariff,
but the rates were less than suggested by Chase. A direct
tax and an income tax were also imposed, but they were not
to be effective until after periods of eight and ten months
respectively. No more financial legislation v/as possible
until the following winter, so the administration was left
poorly equipped v;lth resources for the contest now entered
upon.
When Congress met in December of 1861, the sec-
retary in his regular annual report was obliged to revise
his estimates of July, and to ask Congress for further means
of raising funds. He now estimated that appropriations
would be larger by $214,000,000. He recommended a slight
(1) Sherman, J., Recollections
.
page 252.
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increase in customs duties, a readjustment of direct taxes
so that the loyal States should pay all of the $20,000,000
required by the Federal Government of the States, and the
imposition of slight internal revenue duties, v;hich includ-
ing the income tax, would yield $30,000,000.
In the development of the tax system necessary
to meet the demands of war Chase took no leadership. So,
in January 1862, Congress adopted a more determined policy,
and announced its purpose to enact a revenue measure which
v/ould yield $150,000,000 annually. The plans included the
development of the Internal revenue system and an increase
in customs duties. The guiding principle in the internal
revenue act of July 1, 1861, was the imposition of moder-
ate duties on a large number of objects rather than heavy
duties on a few. It included rates on luxuries, licenses
upon occupations; in fact, wherever there was an article,
a product, a trade, a profession, or a source of income,
there v/as a tax.
At the same time as the passage of the above bill,
a tariff measure was enacted (July 4, 1862) since a revision
of the Import duties was absolutely required in vie^r of
the new duties placed by the internal revenue act upon domes-
tic manufactures and industries. The protective features
v/ere added to compensate for the increased internal duties.
On June 30, 1864, another tariff act was passed
and, like its predecessor, v/as necessary because of the in-
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creased excise duties placed on manufactures. It hov/ever,
v/ent farther along the line of protection and did much to
bring the customs duties up to the level to which the
country has since been accustomed.
The income tax proved a very remunerative source
of funds during the Civil War. The first tax on incomes
was authorized August 5, 1861, at a rate of 3 percent on
excess of incomes over $800 a year. This was increased in
1862 and again in 1865, until Incomes betv/een $600 and
$5000 were taxed at a rate of 5 percent; and incomes above
$5000 at a rate of 10 percent. As the Immediate war
necessities became less pressing, the limit of exemption
became $1000, and in 1867, $2000. In 1872, the tax was
abolished. On the following page is a table containing
the number of persons assessed and the amount of revenue
collected. The table clearly shows how productive the
tax was.
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INCOME TAXATION
Year Number of Persons Amount
Assessed Collected
1863 $ 2,471,000
1864 20,294,000
1865 32,050,000
1866 460,170 72,983,000
1867 266,135 66,014,000
1868 254,617 41,455,000
1869 276,661 34,791,000
1870 74.775 37.775.000
Total 1,322,353 $307,833,000 (D
Owing to the delay in establishing the system,
its assistance was not felt during the early years of the
war, but in the subsequent reorganization of the finances
this revenue was of great help.
A' comparison of the receipts and expenditures
i s shown in the follov/ing table. The figures are in mi
lions of dollars
.
Year Expend. Total Taxes Deficit
1862 $ 496.6 $ 51.9 $ 417.7
1863 718.7 112.0 606.7
1864 865.0 243.3 621.7
1865 1295.1 322.0 973.1
(2)
The weakest element in the financiering of the
Civil War was the delay in applying effective taxation.
In the first place. Chase was loathe to change the exist-
ing tax schedules except to raise a few taxes here and
(1) Dewey, Financial History of the U.S., page 320.
(2) Dewey, Financial History of the U.S., page 330.
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there. His inactivity was d’ae primarily to the fact that
the position of Secretary of the Treasury during such a
critical period was of “too great proportion" for him. (1)
In the second place, Chase, like many others, believed
that the war would be of short duration, and that the
Morril tariff (enacted in 1860) would be sufficient for
the increased needs of the treasury. In the third place,
since there was antagonism betv/een Chase and Congress,
Congress delayed in acting upon Chases recommendations
such as they were.
From the above it may be concluded that during
a national emergency it absolutely essential that capable
men be selected for the positions of responsibility.
Moreover, there must be no antagonism between the various
departments in the government. Success in any undertaking
is dependent on cooperation which welds the component
parts into a firm unit untouched by the retarding in-
fluence of personal antagonisms.
Chase was also unv/llling to incurr the disfavor
of the people by Increasing the tax burden. The possibility
of Incurring disfavor should not be a deterrent from the
right course of action during a period of national emer-
gency, What*s more, Chase should have recognized the fact
that the people were willing to be taxed. According to
(1) Sherman, J.
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the statements of Impartial observers the willingness of
the people to be taxed was noteworthy. A foreign secre-
tary remarked to Secretary 3ev;ard that he was learning
something new about popular government and its strength.
•'I was not surprised, " he said, “to see your young men
rnjshing enthusiastically to fight for their flag. I have
seen that in other countries. But I have never seen a
country where the people were clamorous for taxation." (1)
David A. Wells, a careful observer of financial and indus-
trial affa.irs during the war, has said that such was the
fervor and determaination to push the war to a successful
end, that the people rejoiced in taxation. “The country
was rich, and its accumulated resources had not for near-
ly two generations been in any degree drawn upon the
national government for extraordinary taxation." (2)
The revenue receipts in the latter months of the war were
almost beyond belief. In the fiscal year, 1865 to 1866,
the tax receipts v/ere almost $500,000,000, as much as in
the eight years preceding the war. There were no serious
attempts to evade taxation. The above clearly shows that
during the Civil war the people were not adverse to taxa-
tion.
The willingness of the people to be taxed was part-
(1) Dewey, R.D., Financial History of the United States,
page 300.
(2) Dewey, R.D., Financial History of the United States,
page 300.
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ly due to the material prosperity of those portions of
the nation which escaped the ravages of war. Prices were
rising rapidly and this with the enormous demand for manu-
factured and agricultural products for the army gave for
the time being an unexampled stimulus to the farmer and
manufacturer.
A convincing illustration of the willingness of
the people to submit to revenue exactions was seen in the
unprotesting acceptance of the income tax. In times of
peace this duty, new to the federal budget, v/ould have met
probably immediate condemnation. Under the circumstances,
however, its imposition and payment was considered a
patriotic duty.
The conclusions to be drawn from a review of
taxation during the Civil War are as follows: first, taxa-
tion should be applied without delay, for by so doing,
resort to the more expensive instruments of war finance
is postponed. Moreover, a strong tax program applied
immediately has a stimulating effect upon the confidence
of the people in the government; second, the possibility
of incurring the disfavor of the people by increasing the
burden of taxation should not act as a deterrent from the
right course of action during a period of national emer-
gency.
In the financing of the Civil War there developed
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the policy of having tax and loan bills go hand in hand
as a mutual support to one another. This development
came in the later years of the war. It is a policy to
be followed in the future, since it makes for a definite-
ness of action and has a stimulating effect on the con-
fidence of the people. A firm groundwork of taxation is
quite essential for the support of the other financial
activities of the government.
Taxation durin^^ the World War .
The war which came upon Europe so suddenly in
August 1914, seriously affected the finances of the
national government. Commerce v/as disorganized; imports
were checked; and customs duties declined.
The revenue measure enacted October 22, 1914
Increased the duties on fermented liquors, imposed special
taxes on bankers and brokers, reintroduced the stamp taxes,
and made other slight changes in the internal revenue
schedule. This would yield $54,000,000; and, as it was
believed that the emergency was but temporary, the act was
to expire at the end of 1915. The yield of these two taxes
nearly met expectations, but this was not enough to off-
set the final losses of the year. The spread of prohibition
cut into the revenue from distilled and fermented liquors
and customs duties declined $83,000,000. The fiscal year
of 1915 sav/ a deficit of over $30,000,000.
The need for more generous aporopriations for
the army and the navy and for national defense, even if the
n r( r t r J (:»0l
” r f S: ^ Xii.j
/ »\£OC,C.CP. i- r i'*"-
'
i 'to 6'^ziV I ? o" »'• i r' " - ‘ •' *'• • "«pOj. %.Ci- X - :
'
’
-?T : ' '-I' «*
;
•.
•..'wr I*: 'I- Jnooqwe in':..; oJit-p
r> • I-: '.' I ;i A
(
'J ‘i.
("Tj vjr'^bijiri TB fioo'-' -' v.
“to
_
;
^
-
.
:- v
. r.J:'
.
-.' * lof'^
I
‘
..'•if • •:,/ -'XT
» 'f'fpcioo . • '.. Xe.':cXx.'M
‘
;
’• rrrvct s i;*'; in. ' ;'>y H" >•
- X
-
:.,;tave'? -jX-T
f r ^ :f|'
1
- <
*
.‘ V: '.i
‘
‘f -,
.’BIV -J T*
.r-- 'cv .rr.'i^'tr : iri: fli 2r»\r.y.- ;
-irv . "" *'
-
-iV; • .-•*•7 «>.'i "'C - ; r*i\ r'j'':
•• 1.'.
'.' ,( .• •
^"•'
s ..
it 1 01
1 • f ,-«.»•*> ' I'
rol '*0 ' : - »: • ' ^Xi-"* ^
.
' :0 .66':
,
^-"6
-'^nriJoeb niitt: ';••' •': '’'
't-jjvc ctioilel' ' '/•.- IXX zG
itAr! CV-". vrtia f
-15-
United States did not enter the war, was recognized by the
administration. Consequently, on June 3, 1916, the
National Defense law was enacted calling for largely in-
creased expenditures. The sending of troops to the Mexican
border in the summer of 1916 and the forthcoming outlays
for the new Shipping Board had to be provid.ed for also.
To meet these heavy expenditures Congress voted
(December 7, 1915) to extend the revenue act of 1914; to
retain the duty on sugar, v/hich by provision of the Under-
v/ood tariff v;as to be free; and for additional relief,
nev/ taxes v/ere levied under the revenue act of 1916. The
significant features of the measure are as follows :-
The income tax was increased by making the nor-
mal rate on Individuals and corporations 2 instead of 1
percent, and the graduated surtax on incomes of $80,000
or over was raised. For incomes of $2,000,000 and over,
the surtax was raised from 6 to 13 percent. (2) A pro-
gressive tax on inheritances was introduced, ranging from
1 percent on amounts in excess of $50,000 to 10 percent
on amounts in excess of $5,000,000. There was some op-
position as the separate States v/ere beginning to utilize
this fiscal aid, but the plea of emergency prevailed.
Three times previously the inheritance tax had been raised,
but was abandoned v/hen the emergency was over. (3) A tem-
porary excise tax of 12^ percent on the net profits of
munitions manufacturers was levied. (4) A tariff com-
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mission was established. The duties of the commission
were confined to the investigation of the administration
and the fiscal and industrial effects of the United States
customs lav/s, and their relation to federal revenues and
Industries of the country.
A further step in the preparation for emergency
was taken March 3, 1917, by the passage of an act to pro-
vide a special fund for military and naval purposes. By
this lav; funds were to be derived from the excess-profits
tax and an increase in the inheritance tax which v;as to
be graduated from 1^ to 15 percent. The excess-profits
tax was 8 percent on the amount by which the net Income of
a partnership or corporation exceeded $5,000 and 8 percent
of the actual capital invested. The new taxes proved
fruitful; the treasury budget suddenly expanded; ordinary
receipts rose from $777,000,000 in 1916 to $1,123,000,000
in 1917, an Increase of 40 percent. For this gain the in-
come tax was responsible, yielding $360,000,000 as compared
with $125,000,000 in 1916.
The past revenue experience of the United States
was entirely inadequate to furnish a basis for future legis-
lation to meet the enormous fiscal task placed on the shoul-
ders of the government by its entry into the conflict. The
war was to be fought overseas, and it was quite impossible
to estimate v;ith any degree of accuracy the cost. In
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December, 1917, when the country had been eight months
at war, McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury, laid down his
estimates for the fiscal year of 1918, as over ^10,000,-
000,000 for the war and navy departments, and $6,000,000,000
for loans to foreign governments. As the income tax was in
operation as a result of the sixteenth amendment, it v/as
natural to look in its* direction for increased revenue.
The War Revenue Act, which v;as approved October
3, 1917, related v/holly to internal revenue duties, in-
cluding an excess-profits tax and an income tax on cor-
porations and individuals. Old rates were Increased and
new ones added. The excess profits tax authorized in
March was repealed, and the munitions tax was lov/ered from
18^ to 10 percent. The total internal revenue duties col-
lected in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1917 were
$909,000,000. It was estimated that the new act would
provide $3,400,000,000, an increase of two and a half
billion dollars.
The principal items to provide this enormous
levy were estimated as follows: excess profits tax,
$100,000,000; income tax, $851,000,000; distilled spirits,
$140,000,000. These four items thus accounted for four-
fifths of the expected gain.
To secure the additional revenue from the income
tax, the normal tax was raised from 2 to 4 percent; exemption
v/as lowered to $1,000 for unmarried and $2,000 for married
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persons. Surtaxes v;ere greatly increased; first, by making
the taxes effective on incomes over $5,000 instead of over
$20,000; second, by changing the graduated scale from 1 to
13 percent to 1 to 63 percent. Incomes of $2,000,000 or
over paid a total rate of 67 percent. As Professor Seligman
said, "This is the high-v;ater mark thus far reached in the
history of taxation. Never before, in the annals of civi-
lization, has an attempt been made to take as much as two-
third.s of a man's income by taxation. (1) The excess-
profits tax was practically a new tax. It was imposed
upon the profits of all businesses which showed a profit
in excess of that during the period 1911-1914. Deductions
ranging from 7 to 9 percent of the capital were allov;ed.
The tax was graduated according to the excess profit: 20
percent on the excess up to 15 percent; 35 percent on the
excess from 15 to 20 percent and so on up to 60 percent on
an excess over 33 percent.
In the summer of 1918, a revenue bill of $8,000,-
000,000 was proposed. Congressional action v/as slow, and
while the bill was still under discussion, the Armistice
was signed in November. Reductions in the proposed rates
were immediately made, and the estimated yield was reduced
from 8 to 6 billions. Finally in February, 1919, the bill
was passed.
(1) Seligman, E.R.A., Essays in Taxation, page 642
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Few important new taxes were introduced in the
bill. Old rates were revised and many increased. It
was estimated that four-fifths of the 6 billions would
be derived from the income and excess profits taxes.
The law was retroactive
,
covering excess profits and
incomes for the year 1918. Slightly lower rates were
proposed for subsequent years. The following table shows
the rates of normal tax imposed by the act of 1919 as
compared with previous laws.
Amount of Act* of Act of Act of Act of
net income 1913 1916 1917 1919
$ 1000-2000 Exempt Exempt 2 6
2000-3000 Exempt Exempt 2 6
3000-4000 1 2 4 6
4000-5000 1 2 4 6
over 5000 1 2 4 12 (1)
The only great error made in the governments
taxation program during the World War v/as in the assumption
that the emergency would be of short duration. This as-
sumption necessitated the recasting and reenacting of
the first tax bill passed at the outset of the emergency.
During the lapse of time funds were lost. The best pro-
cedure is to see the emergency through, then arrange the
taxation plan accordingly. All in all, the government's
taxing activities during the war were admirable. Increased
taxation was applied immediately without fear of any dis-
favor that might be Incurred. During the war, the policy
tax bills supporting loan bills was further developed.
The advantages of such a plan have been dis-
Xl) Shlrras, George, The Science of Public Finance, page 90.
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cussed under taxation during the Civil War. Although no
exact ratio was formally adopted, there slowly developed
the conviction that taxation should provide at least one
third of the cost of the war.
The Theories of Taxation .
From a reviev/ of taxation during the Civil and
World Wars, we have seen that the government must and
should rely rather heavily on an Increased use of this
financial tool to procure funds during a period of hosti-
lities, Though the Revolutionary Government Would have
greatly appreciated increased taxation's aid during its
conflict, the mechanism by which this v/ould be possible
was not at that time instituted.
Taxes not only transfer purchasing pov/er directly
to a government, but by decreasing incomes which in turn de-
creases consumption, taxes divert productive resources to
the needs of the government. In other words, since in-
comes are diminished, there is less competition for those
products which the government needs to v;age a successful
war. This is no small item when we consider the diminu-
tion of consumption which must have occurred during the
last war, when tax bills of six and eight billions of
dollars went into effect.
The effect of the expenditure of the proceeds of
taxation need have no effect on the general level of
prices for the sura total of the means of payment is not
.^-- ’
.
- v>' ’ . ^
*
,
*
‘(Hf £lntrc'rf.tjt4 .^r^‘?f sd^ <^f«f.'w' >6ae;;o
.
«'
-
.
'
-
.
^9qoi:eve<», ^'S>i5sr t^XfsfrroY «ji'r tfocxa
<fr ' TT' -'^
'
^
fino >9<fci ta ^IVQW
lo t^joe flffct xO jS^irfJ
f--, -. 'feSBHfci njg.^xt-?
E^ i I.t'^ '^iT AOltsxeS' Jiro a- faoit
'6nup5, ‘^ns^zmw^TS^ tMt a&9n ,r«10W
':. T-
'
*"'
'
'^T'-v'
‘
SI alfiT I'o 9^*u: ftosHa'Tnr ^ «5 «o ftXx/o.'la ,’
"ij-soAJ lo ^b/nac a Tjffii/tcft ytwboi^ .a^ Xoox X^lonAnll
-
'-
<;yirri Mi-of ifJ^*t^-:>v,q^
irv- .
'
2:S-t :^nJi^ub fvf-4r;Je ' RoXiTJWDsJ &®ialoa*jq<3a
.. Kk
DXd.tfSdo^',9!^' a/W- J^llJcioo
i2i
.
'
. 'ja
mis- SAfiS' Sm 3iwi itt fk'
,-
,
'
f:
-at> K^rwi rfoJUlsir ao^c'tiii ttf . jd oi
•
'
'
.-f-. f '4*
o f <5«0T''io*;'^'£ ^7XToL'^,cnc\T a-iSXA^ , nC>J5^<?Kir!ili;od aaa^ja'xc
'
,»'
.
.*
.
^ •"
I
..
.
, I
'
;-'
'*-fii',.‘?f'ftJt<^ ';g.t)ao'lr
,
'
'^^5*' afosojo -iV
‘
*iat rt^xe/ir^qmoo nl ^iA/ir «'t3 a^aioo -,,q
y? ‘'Ii-*’J%E50'jiJ2 - oS ^ii&^Snnmdni9lrc% swt^r. floLirr stoiibcnqi
-
-'f't :*’bXeuo;5' ^iw CA aZ-aXiiT .tU’» A
,
• «t " ' *•
,
u . -
'
' *
^ *
* eiU iixl-j^rfmd^tJfjc^ 9(Vaf( taq®;:H<>Xd« 'Rb7'J^^at<^AO“ ^ ^
ta^4a X'.-a *xii %6 sSi-t€
• i i
vj
, '»i
.±o6Vt5 otal Jfisw a-SiiXIoJb
•• *
ca
to, eif*f no <^o avnr. 5eaft ^toi^AXA;^
\.»j
iuff; f\X "jeo ’s.fiA’Sjf; tO' ap rto^ -?ao
.
^
.•. :
4:'
' " '
. . 4 '.
- 21-
increased. However, particular prices may change because
the government's demand is concentrated on a small range
of commodities. These prices will rise due to the impact
of a new and intensive demand on a supply which cannot be
immediately increased; in the second place, a government
is, comparatively speaking, a wasteful and inefficient
buyer. These two facts combined with the impossibility for
governments to higgle over prices during a period of emer-
gency may make for a rise in Individual prices. Both in
the Civil and in the World v;ars, prices of agricultural
and manufactured products rose greatly. That the height-
ening of these prices was due in part to increased govern-
ment demand is supported by the fact that, even after these
prices were corrected by the index of inflation, they v/ere
much higher than the average •U'i
We might conceive of a situation in which increased
figures might lead to a rise in the general level of prices.
Suppose a great many people were to borrow from the banks
to pay a part or the whole of the increased taxes. If the
increased bank credit were enough, there might be a rise
in the generel level of prices due to the increase in the
means of payment. From an examination of the three wars
no material was found which would suggest that borrowing
to pay taxes was a fact. However, borrowing to pay in-
creased taxes might occur in the future; therefore the
possibility of the price level being affected by such
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action should be recognized. But from such data as are
available, the conclusion is that the expenditure of the
proceeds of increased taxation has its effect on individual
prices only.
Taxation As The Sole Instrument of War Finance.
During the World War, there v;ere many authorities
who recommended that the whole or almost .the whole of the
necessary purchasing pov/er be raised by taxation. One of
these so-called "financial purists" is O.M. Sprague who
said, "I am strongly of the opinion that a great modern
war, enormously costly as it is, can and should be main-
ly if not entirely financed from the proceeds of taxation
levied during its progress. " (1) There were many objectors
to the tenets of the "financial purists". One of the most
vehement objectors was Professor Sellgman who said, "In
order to raise even one-half of the nineteen billions
that were asked for in 1918, it v^ould have been necessary
not only to take by taxation most all the smaller in-
comes and all the higher incomes, but also confiscate
virtually all the business profits; and finally, after
levying crushing taxes on consumption, to take such part
of the existing private property in the United States
as v/ould find a ready market abroad." (2) in his essay
on this point. Professor Seligman was very convincing
and substantiated his argTiments by a multitude of facts.
On the other hand, O.M. Sprague's treatment of the sub-
(1) O.M. Sprague, From a lecture given at Harvard
University on Financing the World War, 1919.
(2) Sellgman, E.R.A. Essays in Taxation, page 640.
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Ject was, In the main, theoretical and well-removed from
the realm of fact. Comparing the arguments of the two
authorities, one is inclined to agree with the former's.
Another renowned authority on matters financial is
J.M. Keynes who also objects strenously to the holdings
of the "financial purists" when he says, "The object dur-
ing a war is to curtail general consumption, and it would
be quite insufficient to curtail the excess consumption
of the relatively rich since their consumption, especially
in time of war, is not a large proportion of the general
consumption. Thus the taxation would have to be aimed at
the relatively poor since it was their consumption, in
view of the aggregate magnitude, which had somehow or
other to be reduced". Keynes goes on to suggest that
during the last war it would have meant, "five shillings
on the pound. No government engaged in a v/ar could be
expected to add to its other difficulties the political
problem of such a tax". (1) Mr. Keynes's opinion adds
more weight to the argument that taxation alone would
be inadequate for the financing of a modern war.
However, there is an absolute limit to the taxable
capacity of any given country, because after a certain
point it is impossible to find further which v/ill not
either react so unfavorably on business enterprise as to
(1) Keynes, Treatise on Money, Vol.II, page 167.
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lower the total field of taxation, or so burden the
necessary expenditure of the poor classes as to become
intolerable. From an observation of the financing of
the wars already mentioned, it is impossible to say
definitely whether or not they could have been financed
mainly from the proceeds of Increased taxation. Never-
theless from a perusal of the above-mentioned arguments,
grave doubts arise as to the possibility.
As has been suggested, there is an absolute
limit to the taxable capacity in a given land. But from
a study of taxation during the three wars, there is every
reason to believe that there was more room for the exploita-
tion. During a period of war hysteria, people feel that
it is their patriotic duty to submit without objection
to greatly Increased taxation.* This feeling can be inten-
sified by subtle suggestion on the part of the government.
During an emergency, the instinct for self-preservation
is very strong. People realize that everything done to
bring a war to a successful close is in their own in-
terest, for defeat may bring burdens much heavier than
a mere increase in taxation. Witness the facts in the
Civil War. When there was delay in applying effective
taxation, the citizens actually clamored for activity
along this line. In the World War, though taxation v/as
Increased by billions of dollars over the pre-war figures,
there was very little objection to the Increase.
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Tpxation must evpr bp conpii^rpd in its rslstion
to national income, for as national income inore?>fTes the
possibility of further increases in taxes exists. During
the v;ar exp'^rience of the United States the eypppi^nce has
been that national income incr-^ases greatly. If this is the
experience during ^utur'^ wars
,
the gov'^rnment should not
hesitate to apply greatly increased taxation. During the last
war, an internet ional banker mad® the following calculation
to shov; that the taxation possibilities were not
-^ully ex-
p].oited by Ungland during the last war. "The whole debt of
Ungland at the beginning of 1916 ^”as only eoual to th® national
income of Ungland for one year, and, whereas the increase
the debt as compared '"ith that at th® end 0^ th® TTapol®onio
Uars Vv’as only 1455
,
th® national income had incr®rr®d Sb05."(Jj
In th® United States during th® same pe.'^iod, the national in-
come had increased, to an even greater extent ”’h®;^eas th®
government debt and taxation had not increased nearl'^’" as much
as in Ungland. (2;
Since this is th® ca®®, ''’n mey conclud® that a
more intensified use o-^ taxation might have been m.ede during
the Civil and Uorld Wars. During wars in the u^ture it is
the government's problem to -^ind th®
(JJ Troyes, A., Uinrncial Chapters of the ’"orld "ar, Peg® loO
.
{Z) Statement bas®d. on '^igures the Torld "Imanac.
1 ( if ' '
'* ^ t ^
1 ..< •'Cf i’^L'.*:'
^
.^r'-
,c I ' ; ; I X ^r'irt t rr, •?.
^
«t;c >rt.k
'
X *C' .t fxrt o X . ‘il!
’S'-' -’i
f '! „ 5 ''i"-'' .' :ci v;i)-2,l ' f^l^'.^'ccr "Ty
’
’
', '
' s.
,
px * r?- , . • li'
1
. / I i'. : 'f J ^ • I'll -• • (. - .r- •: Xo; t *.’43 X
';.
- wTvi F, r VO • ' (
d^ r - \:L" C j_
}ri.\ -cXip- •:'• ' --i', "C^V
f
'
if! tf X ' : ;. * •'' ft'F 'r* ir
-
** t'-
’XXj.' 'O.'i'"''' S'k f'X.LX : • i n:. X .r<^^' :vv
'f dr-‘ X X i;X ' . “ '*" F-l 'X -'r
( .• ;>!'<
'r "vi.t- '. i- ) u" i:r ''c
’<’:
•'
r
f-i *;i ;-r ‘
,
:i F.*- : ; ?. J5, - :ij- :.:
J :
'
- 26-
absolute limit to taxation thus making unnecessary a too in-
tensified use of the more expensive tolls of finance.
It is interesting to note that how much a govern-
ment can increase taxation depends not only on taxation's
effect on the national Income but also on the temper of the
people to be taxed. That is, exploitation possibilities vary
from nation to nation. Let us compare England and the United
States on the one hand, and France and Italy on the other dur-
ing the last war. The first two paid for 17 percent of their
war expenditures by taxes. France paid virtually nothing by
( 1 )
taxes; Italy enough to pay for the Interest of its war loans.
Though the people of the latter two nations might balk at an
Increased burden of taxation, most of the people of the first
two nations would agree that increased taxation is the most
sensible course to follow during a period of national emer-
gency.
(1) Noyes, A., Financial Chapters of the World War, page 121
-al wOJ A noiiJex.fvJ •ttmJtI,.^#;juXG9d^
'"S- - j. -' ^ ^
. .-.-•oai^i'i 'tc VI erijijTrsj^f. ,. e^oifs. eif/ fS' ^£xr
-n'^e^d'n 2 »o>iX 5SnIt89*i$^ai «i
.*,-r,,
- ' '^'4
IL% no t^oo n paw^^ri nvc. tneet]jC2 yv’j.
10 no osX ^ ^'WQ ^ifTiO^lni. XfiAOltVfl otiJ ffc*
'
' \ <
"
'
'
'
"
»
^
'^'^ijn-'j Wr^ Ot^ 5m>X^n5 -^lAg^ua ai; JM ’;x\pi:^j^ xjdjt5^>!i it'otI
-
i
< *9r
-*:i/t* 2uC? DO i^p *3x1^ nqi ?.^ f at© - ^' ’«
?nf/y^at4 Ti -uxl? .'TJWr
^,(3 3niVti4i soAtn'? -daKio:# x< ao^OKXf'ino^L^v '*i!wi^
rji- iL§pi -^)!^ ^o t«0 o^ -^^on-v 'tlx.Jl
"• / ,'f . . ^
r*, xi-^tf xii:^ ^ojoi^ vfi vr^r ed^ ^xxorit.?
=. ' V - 5 ' • ' ,
‘ *
‘^j i '1
-
‘ -'
'^'
.
-=->' ’
t J * iV »^-
i>d<r io §lqo8ii ©tfo \p
"/ •
^adm 3 X tioi^iXBy 6»a«a*30fti tsd;? at*?^ ' X;jow wfftoIiisD ow^.,
-'ioiT'^ 1» 5olna<i H •soI'Ttto rciXo'^ 5 a^!‘0^ oXdXaaaa;
^
*
*
-
'
•
. tona^
-» r
>
•j'
t •.' •" 4
- r >sV;
•
’li*^ .,<€<-i'' '^
Xii a-tnq > .'ixs* ad^ , ' A^
'
’
« *f'
"' *'
^ rlw)
- 27-
CHAPTER II
BORROWING
Borrowing During the Revolutionary War
The loans of the United States during the period
1776 may be grouoed under tv/o headings, domestic and foreign.
The borrowing of money by Congress, with the exception of a
small loan In June, 1775, for the purchase of gunpov/der, v/as
not authorized until October 3, 1776, nearly a year and half
( 1 )
after beginning of the Revolution. By that time the bills
of credit had been Issued, and little was forthcoming in the
v/ay of taxes for the use of Congress; consequently authority
v;as given for borrov;ing $5,000,000 at the rate of 4 percent.
For placing the loan, loan offices were established in each
state; lenders received indented certificates corresponding
to the modern coupon bonds in denominations of $300 to $1000;
commissioners, remunerated at a rate of one-eighth of one
percent on the amounts received, were appointed by State au-
thorities, in order to allay local jealousy. Payment was prom-
ised in three years. The rate of interest offered was too
lov/, and in the subseouent loans of January 14, and February
22, 1777, the rate was increased to 6 percent. Again the
results were not favorable: during the first year between
October, 1776, and Seotember, 1777 the amount received was
( 2 )
only $3,787,000. About this time Congress v:as able to
( 1 ) Hockett
,
J
. ,
Political and Social History of the U.S
,
,
p . 90
(2) Dev:ey
.
R.D., Financial History of the U.S ., p. 46.
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secure a loan from France, and it was determined to meet the
interest on the domestic, loan certificates by bills of ex-
change drawn on the foreign funds in possession of the Ameri-
can envoys in Paris. This increased the credit of the home
loan offices, so from September, 1777, until the offices were
closed, $63,289,000 in paper was subscribed, of which the
specie value was only $7,684,000, according to the scale of
deoreciation adooted by Congress in 1780.(1)
After March 1, 1782, the Interest was not met, and
indents or certificates of interest indebtedness, were issued;
since these were receivable for taxes by the state, they were
in part redeemed and cancelled by payment into the Federal
Treasury on State account. In addition to loan-office certi-
ficates, there v;ere other forms of certificates, such as those
issued by qua.rter-masters, commissaries, and other purchasing
agents. So urgent were the needs of the army, that through-
out the war it v/as necessary to impress large quantities of
suoplies, in return for v.’hich certificates of value v/ere given.
These obligations were of a great variety and contracted v/ith-
out order or system, and the amount outstanding in 1790 was
estimated by Hamilton at $16,708,000. Short time and tempor-
ary loans to the amount of $1,272,842 were also obtained in
1782 and 1783 from the new Bank of North America. (2)
Funds v;ere obtained either in loans or subsidies
from the governments of France and Spain and from private
(1) Bullock, C.J., Finances of the U.S .. page 266.
(2) Ibid , pages 270 to 300.
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bankers in Holland. The first assistance came from France
in 1776 in the form of a subsidy; and a small subsidy was
secured from the Spanish treasury. France also granted sub-
sidies of 2,000,000 livres in 1777 and 6,000,000 livres in
1781. In all, these sums amounted to ^1,996,500. Betv;een
1777 and 1783 the United States borrowed from France,
$6,352,500; Holland, $1,304,000; Spain, $174,017; a total
of $7,830,517.
By years the foreign loans v/ere obtained as follows:
France Spain Holla.nd
1777 $ 181,500
1778 544,500
1779 181,500
1780 726,000
1781 '1,736,763
1782 1,892,237
1783 1,089,000
Total $ 6,352,500
$128,804
45,213 $720,000
584 . 000
$174,017 $1,304,000 (1)
Attempts were early made to obtain loans to be
reoaid in France, secured by the exportation of goods from
America; but the danger of capture by the English cruisers
broke this policy. The earlier negotiations were secret
for fear on the part of France and Spain of political com-
plications with England,
At the outset of the war, it could not be hoped
that the colonies v/ould be able to borrow, abroad, and, in-
deed if it had not been for the hostile feeling between Eng-
(1) Dewey, R.D., Financial History of the United States,
page 47.
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land and France, there is no reason to suppose that the
new republic could have borrov/ed in Europe at all. As
for borrov/ing at home, that implies an s.mount of capital
which did not exist at the time. From a survey of Revo-
lutionary borrov/ing activities, it is seen that to borrov/
either at home or abroad government credit must be well
established. The growing credit of the nev/ republic is
reflected in the favorable rate of interest, 5 percent,
%
demanded on the Dutch bankers loans. By 1782 it was seen
in Holland that victory was assured, and there v;as "not only
an intelligent appreciation of the immense resources of the
country which could be aoplied to the extinction of the
debt; but also confidence in the political integrity of the
new government." (1)
Congress first and last authorized loans far
larger than could be actually secured. This is very poor
financing, for if an issue of obligations is undersubscribed,
the obligations tend to sell at a discount. An offshoot of
the above is that the interest rate should be raised so as
to increase the demand. This the Revolutionary govern-
ment failed to do and this factor combined v/ith the lack
of faith in the government militated against a successful
borrowing program during the Revolutionary War.
The indebtedness of the government apart from the
outstanding bills of credit at the beginning of 1784 was
(1) Bullock, C.J., Finances of the United States , pa.ge 303.
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as follov/s
:
Foreign, including arrears of interest
Loan office certificates
Unliquidated certificates of indebtedness
Arrears of interest on domestic debt
Total
$ 7,921,886
11.585.000
16.708.000
5.109,000
$39,323,886 (1)
At the close of the war a reduction in exoenditures
v/as expected but not easily made. The pay of the soldiers
and officers had to be taken care of, but still there were
no funds. Recourse v/as made once more to promises and cer-
tificates of indebtedness carrying interest. Government
credit sank so lov/ that liquidated and certificated claims
against it were v/orth less than fifteen cents on the dollar.
The main conclusion to be drav/n from the study of
borrowing during the Revolutionary War is that it is impos-
sible for a government to pursue a successful borrowing
program if its credit is impaired to any degree. A govern-
ment obligation is only as good as the government itself,
and, if any action or event occurrs to hurt the people’s
confidence in the government, the latter’s obligations suf-
fer.
(1) Dewey, ERA. Financial History of the United States
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Borrowlng During the Civil War
When Secretary Chase took office, the public debt
was $74,985,000, of which about $18,000,000 had been incurred
since the beginning of the secession movement. (1) Until Con-
gress met for new legislation, Chase was obliged to rely on
previous loan acts of which the treasury had not yet fully
availed itself. The result was not encouraging. Only a
small amount of bonds was sold and these at a discount; a
few million in treasury notes was inadequate.
The loan bills of July 17, and August 5, 1861, im-
powered the secretary to borrow not exceeding $250,000,000
in three year 7.3 per cent treasury notes or in twenty-year
bonds not exceeding 7 percent. The secretary was also au-
thorized, in lieu of a portion of the above loan, to exchange
for coin or pay for salaries or other dues of the United
States non-interest-bearing treasury not exceeding $50,000,000
of a denomination less than $50 but not less than $5 payable
on demand and receivable for all public dues; or notes bear-
ing Interest at 3.65 percent, fundable into treasury notes
of denominations over $50, and payable in orte year.
In accordance with the provisions of the above act
the secretary undertook to borrow $150,000,000 by the issue
of 7.3 percent three- year notes. (2)
Representatives of the banking institutions of
Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, after consultation with
the secretary, ^ag’reed to unite as associates in financial
(1) Dewey, R.D. Financial History of the U.S., page 276.
(2) Ibid, page 278.
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support to the government, ” to subscribe to an immediate
loan of $50,000,000 and to promise to take two further in-
stallments of $50,000,000 each. The securities to be is-
sued were to be in the form of three-year 7.3 percent
treasury notes. The task of the banks was not easy, for
the institutions undertaking the negotiations possessed
a capital of only $120,000,000, and their coin assets
amounted to only $63,000,000; but it v;as agreed that the
banks should be the medium of popular subscriptions through
which the burden v/as to be transferred to private lenders. (1)
As has been indicated, the loan operations of 1861
were temporary, with the exception of $50,000,000 in twenty-
year 6 percent bonds. In February, 1862, provision was made
for a large 6 percent loan. From this time on loans followed
each other in rapid succession. The various forms of in-
debtedness may be grouped under four general classes seen in
the follov/ing table.
(1) Kiney, D., The Independent Treasury System , pages 101-111.
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Rate of Interest Length of Loan
A. Long terra bonds:
(1) Loans of July and Aug. 1861
(2) Five- twenties of 1862
(3) Loan of 1863
(4) Ten-forties of 1864
(5) Five-twenties of June 1864
(6) Navy pension fund
6 20 years
6 5-20 years
6 17 years
5 10-40 years
6 5-20 years
3 Indefinite
B. Short-term loans:
(7) Treasury notes of 1861
(8) Seven-thirties of 1861
(9) One-year notes of 1863
(10) Two-year notes of 1863
(11) Compound Interest notes
(12) Seven-thirties of 1864 & 1865
(60 days
6 ( 2 years
7.3/10 3 years
5 1 year
5 2 years
6 compound 3 years
7.3/10 3 years
Non-interest notes:
(13) Old demand notes None Indefinite
(14) Legal-tender notes II II
(15) Fractional currency 11 II
Temporary Indebtedness:
(16) Temporary loans 4,5,6 II
(17) Certificates of Indebtedness 6 1 year
The loan act of February 25, 1862, authorized the
issue of $500,000,000 of bonds redeemable after five and pay-
able twenty years from date, bearing interest. The bonds
could be sold 'fet the market value" for either coin or treas-
ury notes. The act proved to be of little immediate import-
ance, for previous to December, 1862, only $23,750,000 of
the issue were sold. (2)
In 1862-1863 temporary loans were secured for which
certificates of deposit bearing 5 percent interest were
granted; and the offers of such loans proved so large that
the first limit of $25,000,000 Imposed by the act of Febru-
ary 25. 1862, was in March 11. extended to $50,000.000, and
(1) Dewey, R.D., Financial History of the United States, page 307
(2) Ibid, page 307
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finally, June 30, 1864, to $150,000,000. These certifi-
cates v;ere in special demand by banks being used for set-
tling clearing house balances.
Another measure to meet temporary needs was the
act of March 1, 1862, authorizing the issue of certificates
of indebtedness to such public creditors as were welling
to receive them in exchange for audited accounts. These
certificates were payable in one year (or earlier at the
option of the government ), bore 6 percent Interest and v/ere
issued in sums not less than $1,000 in amount.
When Congress met in December, 1862, it v/as con-
fronted by a deficit of $276,900,000. Especially serious
were the unpaid requisitions amounting to $46,400,000.(1)
The loan act of March 3, was passed. The measure gave op-
portunity for a great variety of credit operations; it pro-
vided for the issue of one-year, two-year, and compound-
interest notes, and for the sale of 6 percent bonds payable
in not less than ten nor more than forty years. in the form
of notes payable in three years with Interest of 7.3 per-
cent, and, for the sale, the services of Jay Cooke and his
sub-agencies were once again employed. In the latter half
of 1864 $110,800,000 of the “seven- thirties” were sold,
and in 1865 $718,000,000,— the amount originally authorized
being increased $600,000,000 by the Act of March 3, 1865.(2)
This temporary loans not only bore an exceptional rate of
Interest, but carried the privilege of conversion into flve-
(1) Dewey, Financial History of the U.S. page 310.
(2) Ibid, page 315.
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twenty 6 percent bonds.
The use made of the several varieties of loans
during the successive years of the war is compared in the
following table, which gives the net annual increase and
decrease for each group in millions of dollars:
Kind of loan
A. Long-term loans
B. Interest-bearing notes
1861-
1862
1862-
1863
1863-
1864
1864-
1865
1861-
1865
64.8 172.4 466.6 340.8 1044.6
106.4 15.1 209.8 559.0 890.3
158.6 253.2 43.6 2.7 458.1
D. Temporary loans 107.8 154.8 24. 30.9^207.7
437.6 595.5 696.0 871.6 2600.7(2)
The proportion of long-term and short-term in-
debtedness by years may be seen in the following table:
Year Long-term Short-term
1861-
1862 15 percent 85 percent
1862-
1863 29 « 71 »
1863-
1864 67 « 33 ^
1864-
1865 39 ” 61 «
1862-1865 40 60 (3)
Although ^900,000,000 of this latter issue were authorized
but $75,000,000 were sold, since nev/ and successful efforts
were made to dispose of the five-twenties authorized the
year previous.
In selling: these bonds^system of agents was used
(1) Dewey, R.D. Financial History of the U.S., page 315.
(2) Ibid, page 316
(3) Ibid page 317
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to make a wide distribution possible. An experienced
banker, Jay Cook, was employed as general agent, receiv-
ing a commission of three-eighths of one percent on all
sales. He in turn engaged tv/enty-five hundred sub-agents
in a large number of tovms and cities and "made every ef-
>1
fort to present the attractions of bond investment. A
pamphlet was published by this active broker who styled
^eimself as "General Subscription Agent of the Government
Loan"^^ The plan was abandoned by Chase in negotiating
the next loan.
The loan act of March, 1863, also provided for
the issue of short-term notes bearing 5 percent interest;
they were legal tender for face value and convertible,
principal and interest, into United States notes. In the
fiscal year 1863-1864, one-year notes of this character
were sold through the associated banks of Nev/ York, Phila-
delphia, and Boston, aggregating $44,520,000; and two-
year notes to the amount of $166,480,000.(2)
The loan act of March 3, 1864, provided for an
issue of $200,000,000 of bonds bearing interest at not
over 6 percent and redeemable at a period between five
and forty years at the pleasure of the government. The
government placed the minimum period of redemption at ten
years
,
The loan act of June 30, 1864, authorized
(1) Mechanism of Subscription from: C.A. Conant, History of
Modern Banking
,
pages 348-366.
(2) Dev;ey, R.D. Financial History of the U.S. page 313.
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$200 , 000 , 000 .
An examination of the figures in the follov/ing
table will give an approximate idea of the cost of the war.
Expenditures (1862-1865)
War
]B62 38^174000
]B63 60;531^000
im: 69q39],000
Miscella- Interest
neous CO on DebtNavy
4q64q000 2^564P00 iqi9Q000
6^26:1,000 27,42^000 2^72^000
8^70^000 3^18^000 5^68^000
]B65 ],03q69q000 12^617,000 6^39^000 7-^39^000 3,29^09^000
(1) Including pensions & Indians
Total
46^56^000
71^73^000
86^96^000
There are many deductions to be drawn from the loan
operations of the government during the Civil War. When, in
1861, the government v;as about to place its loan of $100,-
000,000, the possibility of this venture succeeding seemed
small, because of the difficulties encountered by the treas-
ury in placing small loans during the winter of 1860-61.
However, three changes in conditions had occured which af-
fected the disposition of the capitalists to invest. In
the first place a definite policy had been adopted. In
the financing of a war the adoption of a- definite course
of action is essential in that the confidence of the citi-
zens is stimulated; if, however, a government's policy is
vacillating, confidence in the government will waver. Lack
of confidence has a disastrous effect upon the price and
sale of government obligations. The second factor which
made the sale of the government obligations easier was the
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Increased interest rate; this more liberal rate tended to
attract capital deprived by political disturbance of its
ordinary commercial use. From this experience it may be
concluded that a government must not hestitate during a
war period to offer an attractive Interest rate in order
to secure funds necessary to its war activities. The
third factor which attracted funds to the government was
the increased loyalty of the people, who recognized that
the government needed financial as well as military support.
To be successful in any warring endeavor a government must
have its citizenry as a united whole in support of the
government’s every activity. Any government financial at-
tempt will fall if the citizens are disloyal and fall to
cooperate.
In the placing of the loan of $150,000,000 the
banks were used as the medium of popular subscription.
In order to prevent the removal of a large volume of money
from the channels of business, the banks desired that the
funds which they loaned to the government should remain
in their custody until checked out by the government to
meet current disbursements. This meant that the banks
would be permitted to use their notes in the payment of
treasury checks. Under the sub-treasury act (1861) (1),
only coin was receivable by the treasury, but the exist-
ing public distrust had caused hoarding, and there was a
relatively small amount of specie then available in the
(1) Bullock, Selected Readings in Public Finance, page 90.
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country; hence the transfer of so large a sum as
$150,000,000 in gold was regarded as impracticable by
many experts. It was maintained that the 8,ct of 1861
gave the secretary elastic powers to receive bank bills
or book credit in the place of coin. The secretary,
however, strictly construed the sub-treasury bill and
insisted that the banks make their payments in specie. (1)
Since gold was so important to the banking system during
Civil War times, it was a bad policy to draw so much
from the system. This demand by Chase for payment in
specie v/as one of the contributing factors to the sus-
pension of specie payments later on. A government
should never pursue a policy which will seriously hinder
industry; for, by so doing, the government may be unable
to secure the products necessary to war purposes.
The loan act of February 25, 1862 proved a
failure. The reasons for the failure are apparent. The
bonds authorized under the issue could be sold ‘*at the
market value", but Chase Interpreted "market value" as
at least equivalent to par value and would not sell the
bonds below par. The framers of the act meant by "market
value", going price. The treasury could have sold a
large amount of bonds at any time if it had placed them
on the market and sold them for what they would bring. (2)
During an emergency, a government cannot afford to be too
(1) Dunbar, The History and Theory of Banking, page 160.
(2) Dewey, R.D., Financial History of the U.S., page 307.
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partlcular in respect to the prices its obligations sell
for. It must take what the obligations v/ill bring, but
at the same time do all in its power to raise the securi-
ties* value by stimulating the people's confidence.
The sale of the bonds authorized under the loan
act of March 3, 1863, gave "gratifying evidence of the
feasibility of a popular loan". The mechanism by which
they were sold has been already indicated— namely, through
Jay Cooke and his sub-agencies. Despite the remarkable
results (^900,000,000 of five- twenty bonds were sold)(l)
Chase abandoned the plan in the negotiation of the next
loan because a few groups criticized the sale of bonds
through agencies outside the immediate control of the
government. There may have been some basis for criticis-
ing of the plan but the fact that the results were so
fruitful should have completely outweighed such criticism.
A government engaged in a desperate struggle should look
to every fruitful means of security funds sjid not deviate
from its course because of a relatively small amount of
criticism. As it happened, the system was once more used
under the administration of Secretary Fessenden and the
results were equally gratifying, but in the interim a
valuable source of funds was closed to the government
through the weakness of Chase.
During the earlier years of the war, there was
(1) Dewey, R. D. Financial History of the U.S., page 311.
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too much reliance placed on the short-term loan. This pol-
icy introduced an element of weakness. At the immediate
outset of a war there is some excuse for short-term loans,
since the preparation of taxation and long-term loan bills
takes time; the government, however, needs funds immediate-
ly. To continue a short-term loan policy is folly. The
country should not be flooded v/ith short-term paper, for
temporary obligations falling due in the midst of a con-
flict is a serious problem, because the treasury must con-
duct refunding operations and at the same time go into the
money market to borrow ever-increasing sums.(l)
The loan act of March 3, 1864, provided for the
sale of bonds at not over 6 percent. The sale of bonds
was very satisfactory until Chase determined to lower the
rate from 6 to 5 percent. The result v;as disastrous.
Bond-buying nearly ceased. The total amount sold up to the
end of the fiscal year, June 30, 1864, was only $73,337,000(2)
To attempt to save on Interest charges at the expense of
bond sales during a war is a serious error.
(1) Ely, E.A. Outline of Economics, page 233.
(2) Dewey, R.D., Financial History of the U.S., page 313.
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Borrowlns During the World War.
The decision of the United States to enter into
the European War against G-ermary imposed financial tasks
of the greatest magnitude. In comparison, all previous
loaning measures seemed small. War was declared April 6,
1917; eighteen days later, in April 24, Congress author-
ized the issue of |5, ©00, 000, 000 bonds at a rate of in-
terest not exceeding 3-|- percent. It, was not, however.
Intended to borrow this full amount at the time. "Expert
advisors varied as to the amount which could be sc3d and
absorbed; some, indeed, doubted if more than $500,000,000
could be borrowed under a single loan".(l) The treasury
decided to call for $2,000,000,000, under what is known
as the First Liberty Loan of 1917. The bonds were to
mature in thirty years but v/ere redeemable in fifteen
years at the option of the government; they were exempt
from all taxation except inheritance or estate taxes im-
posed by the federal government.
To secure the sale of these bonds a direct ap-
(f
peal was made to the entire population. Under the super-
vision of the federal reserve banks. Liberty Loan commit-
tees were established throughout the country^. Bankers,
businessmen, bond houses, newspapers, press associations,
and citizens generally cooperated in a great movement that
(1) Seligman, E.R.A. Essays In Taxation . 717-J-749.
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vibrated with energy and patriotism and swept the country
from coast to coast in the greatest bond- selling campaign
ever launched by any nation. "(1) The Subscriptions
amounted to $3,035,000,000, or nearly 52^ more than the
amount offered. More than four million subscriptions
were made. (2)
A Second Liberty Loan was offered October 1,
amounting to $3,000,000,000. The rate of interest was
raised to 4 percent, but exemption from federal taxes
was not so generous. They were subject to federal in-
heritance taxes and also Income surtaxes and excess-pro-
fits taxes. Again there was oversubscription, the total
amounting to $4,618,000,000, an excess of 54 percent of
the bonds offered. The organization of committees was
perfected; popular appeal was made more effective; and
the total number of subscriptions v/as more than twice
as great as that of the first loan. (3)
Anticipating the sale of bonds was the issue of
short-term certificates running as a rule for a period of
one year. For the sale of these certificates, reliance was
placed on the federal reserve banks. In need of immediate
funds, even before bonds could be sold, the treasury depart-
ment sold certificates by a systematic allotment to the re-
serve banks which in turn distributed them largely to member
(1) Bullock. C.J. Financing: the \7ar. in Q. J.C. ,XXI (1917) 357-379
(2) Ibid. 380-383
(3) Seligman, E.RA., Essays in Taxation . 717-749.
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banks. The latter then sold them to their customers.
The service of the federal reserve banks went
even farther than the making of temporary loans to the
government. They made it possible for purchasers of
Liberty bonds to borrow on easy terms. A preferential
rate of discount was established for rediscount of notes
of member banks secured by government obligations. A
member bank could loan to its customer on the collateral
of a government bond or treasury certificate, in full as-
surance that the note would be rediscounted by its re-
serve bank. As the rediscount rate was no greater than
the Interest on the government obligation, it was possi-
ble for the purchaser of the bond to secure funds, by
pledging it as collateral with his bank which in turn re-
discounted the note with the federal reserve bank. '•With-
out this agency it would have been impossible to secure
the widespread and generous subscriptions to bonds. "(l)
From the following table it is possible to see the nature
of the service rendered the government by the reserve banks
Federal Reserve Bank Discounts. (2)
Year Total discounts Secured by
Gov't obligations
Percent
1918 $1,793 $1,359 76
1919 2,140 1,701 80
1920 2,637 1,159 43
1921 1,198 432 36
figures in millions
(1) G-oldenwelse, The Federal Reserve System in Operation .
pages 40-90
(2) Seligman, Essays in Taxation , pages 760-761
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The Third Liberty Loan was offered in April 1918,
calling for $3,000,000,000. Owing to the speeding up of
business, caused by the demand for war materials, the mar-
ket rate of interest on loanable funds had increased since
the placing of the earlier Liberty loans and these bonds
were now quoted below par. It was decided to offer
percent on the new loans. Again there was oversubscrip-
tion, the total amounting to $4,177,000,000.(1) A Fourth
Liberty loan quickly followed in September of the same
year calling for $6,000,000,000. Supply still exceeded
demand, (^nd the subscriptions received,'] and subscriptions
were received for nearly $7,000,000,000. The rate on this
loan v;as 4^ percent. In order to make this loan more at-
tractive to Investors it was provided that the interest on
$30,000 of these bonds held by one person was exempt from
surtaxes until two years after the close of the war. Fur-
ther compensating exemptions were also granted to the hold-
ders of Second and Third Liberty loans. (2)
In placing these loans, renev/ed efforts were
made to arouse patriotic cooperation. There was a War
Loan Organization with a speakers bureau and a publicity
bureau engaged in the preparation and distribution of post-
ers, buttons, flags, and advertising copy. Liberty days
v/ere designated by presidential proclamation to arouse en-
thusiasm in the several campaigns; and it was estimated
(1) Seligman. Essays in Taxation, pages 762-763
(2) Dewey, R.D,, Financial History of the U.3 .. page 508
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that two million men and women devoted themselves to the
work of distributing bonds. (1)
In May, 1919, the Victory loan of $4,500,000,000
was offered. This v/as in two series of notes, one tax-
exempt, except for inheritance and state taxes, at per-
cent; and the other, subject to surtaxes and excess-pro-
fits taxes, at 4^ percent. As there v/as expectation that
revenue would soon exceed expenditure and that before no
long period, funds could be borrowed at a lower rate, the
Victory notes ran for but a short period, maturing in
1923 and reclaimable in 1922. For a fifth time, the loan
was oversubscribed. (2) The use of short-term certificates
of indebted ness, both in anticipation of Liberty loans
and in anticipation of income ajid excess-profit taxes,
was continued on a large scale throughout the war and sub-
sequently in the financial policy of reconstruction. Be-
tween April 6, 1917 and October 31, 1921, 51 billions were
issued; 21 billions were issued in anticipation of loans;
11 billions in anticipation of taxes; and 19 billions for
special purposes. In October, 1921, about 2 billions of
unmatured certificates were outstanding, thus constituting
a large floating debt which must be funded. (3)
Of no little importance as a factor in popular-
izing Investment in government securities throughout the
(1) Bullock, Financing: the War
.
Q.J.C., page 508.
(2) Seligman, Essays in Taxation , page 777
(3) Dewey, R.D., Financial History of the U. S., page 509.
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war was the sale of thrift stamps and war- savings stamps.
The thrift stamps were issued in denominations of 25 cents,
and the savings stamps in denominations of $5. “Although
the proceeds of the sale of certificates of so small amount
could not he large as compared with Liberty loans, their
use cultivated thrift and often led to investment in bonds
of small denominations." Under the direction of the
National War-Savings Committee, state, county, city, and
town committees were appointed throughout the country.
Introduced in December, 1917, this agency secured in less
than a year the sale of $834,000,000 war- savings and
thrift stamps having a maturity value of over a billion
dollars. (1)
The public debt reached its maximum, approxi-
mately 25 billion dollars, in 1919, as compared with lit-
tle over one billion at the beginning of the war. (2)
A very considerable part of this huge debt was
due to credits in behalf of the European governments en-
gaged in the war against Germany. These governments pur-
chased in the open market in this country large supplies,
both of munitions and food, but were financially power-
less to make payment from their own resources. So the
United States aided them. By four different acts between
April 24, 1917 and July 9, 1918, Congress authorized ad-
V8.nces of 10 billion dollars to be used by the foreign
(1) Bullock. Financing the War , pages 790-795 for material
and quotation.
(2) Dewey, R.D., Financial History of the U.S .. page 516.
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governraents to meet the commitments v/hich required immedi-
ate settlement. The largest credit was made to Great
Britain |4, 300, 000, 000; to France was granted $3,000,000-
000; and to Italy $1,600,000,000. For these advances the
Treasury held obligations in the form of certificates of
indebtedness. The certificates were payable in gold, bore
Interest ranging from 3 to 5 percent, and orriginally were
payable at fixed and early dates of maturity. As the
debtor countries were unable to pay at the assigned dates,
the certificates became demand obligations, carrying an
annual Interest charge of $475,000,000.(1)
Exclusive of debt operations and postal dis-
bursements from postal revenues, the total expenditures
of the government, from April 6, 1917 to October 31, 1919
was over $35,413,000,000. Of this amount $24,133,000,000
or 68 percent was met by the proceeds of loans. (2)
Advances to Foreign Countries by the U.S. (3)
Period England France Italy Others Total
Ap.l917-Nov.l918 $3,696* $1,970* $1,051* $381* $7,098*
Nov. 1918-Nov. 1920 501* 996* 580* 291* 2,368*
Total $4,197* $2,966*
(* 000,000 omitted)
$1 , 631* $672* $9 , 466*
The public debt reached its maximum in 1919 when it
stood at over $25,000,000,000. From this point there was
.
a steady reduction year by year until in 1930 it was brought
(1) Figures from Seligman, E. R.A.. The Cost of the War and
How It Was Met, pp. 750-782.
(2) Dev/ey, R.D., Financial History of the U.S .. page 511.
(3) Taussig, F.W. International Trade , page 312.

- 50-
dovm to 116,185,000,000. The United States had always
endorsed the policy of early debt retirement. Its
achievements after the World V/ar were significant. In
the eight years following the conflict, the reduction
was over 25 percent as compe.red with 22 percent in an
equal period after the Civil War. In 1866, the per capi-
ta debt was 8*78; by 1890 it was less than $20; and Just
before the World War it was $12. In the three years be-
tween 1916 and 1919 the per capita burden rose to $240,
and from that it declined to $131 in 1930.(1) Following
is a table which shows debt reduction, the amount paid
off each year.
1920 $1,184,000,000 1926 $ 873,000,000
1921 322,000,000 1927 1,133,000,000
1922 1,022,000,000 1928 906,000,000
1923 604,000,000 1929 673,000,000
1924 1,009,000,000 1930 746.000.000
1925 735,000,000
Total $9,207,000,000
The outstanding characteristic of the loan policy
pursued by the government during the World War was its
vigor. Unlike governments during previous war, it did
not remain passive, but pursued such an active policy as
to create a demand for its obligations far in excess of
the desired amount. Through its policy of selling ob-
ligations of small denominations, the government tapped
a source of funds hithertofore considered non-existant
.
(1) Dewey. Financial History of the U.S.. page 509.
(2) Ibid, page 511.
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In the future, the government's loan activities during
the World War may be emulated with no small profit.
The financing of the World War brought to
light the invaluable aid a strongly centralized banking
system can render a government in its loaning activities
during a war period.
.
In making the obligations authorized under the
Victory loan of short duration, the government acted with
foresight. When the loan was authorized interest rates
were high so consequently the price paid by the govern-
ment for capital must also be high. But the treasury did
not burden itself with obligations of long maturity;
rather, the officials, realizing that interest rentes would
fall, incurred only short-term indebtedness. During a
period of low interest rates funds may be obtained on more
favorable terms. The above use of short-term obligations
should be recognized as making for less- expensive post-v/ar
financing.
As later events show, the one weakness of the
governments' financial program during the World War was
its willingness to lend money to foreign countries. In
the light of the wholesale repudiation of debts by these
foreign countries, it might seem the wiser policy to be
more careful in .future lending programs
.
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The Theories of Borrowing
Borrowing might seem at first sight, so far
as its effects on prices is concerned, to be like taxa-
tion. Is . not borrowing ,a mere transfer of purchas-
ing power and like taxation, have its effects on indiv-
idual prices only? Such in fact would be the truth of
the matter if the loans made to the government always
came from the actual savings of the lenders. Up to a
certain point government demands for funds can be met
without disturbing the workings of currency and credit.
People can Increase their available funds so as to lend
more to the government by selling their existing hold-
ings of securities. It is of no use for people in the
country which is borrowing to sell securities to one an-
other, because obviously this procedure does not increase
the sum total of resources available. The selling of
securities will be fruitful only if they are sold abroad.
Governments, to Increase the market for their bonds, may
induce people to surrender their foreign securities for
bonds by either a high Interest rate or an appeal to their
patriotism; these two methods failing, the governments may
exert force. Though the United States found it unnecessary
to Increase its market for bonds during the last war, some
of its allies found such action to be profitable. The
British Government tried at first to secure foreign assets
Tr-.' " ZP.
,
^ fv'-'Y!" J’i':. J, ’ ;:• ^flivC'T'^rod
r.'f-
. o;^ ’-in'tC’-'no-''' ‘li rn 9oX sa
...»•.
'‘^'U.
''
' .'"^-••1? S'tJ' I" C 'f '•r
'
^ ,"nt:t
’ \* i-c 1'-; ?.?.r O'*/
.
''
,ro-
:
‘'j •-til r.'.'L' ‘tewCMj
_
d^L-'-r zdt pXj;c?w rX vviluo ‘ ^ ‘ c-
5VfiwX‘v J-rf: .‘-"vw: • 2 0 : v'
'
-.-rt-tr odt
« C'f l
’
.
‘ " •
^'-:
: .'.-t ci<yi^i
;>
-
•-*
.iXoT'T^&O
r ...
_ ^
,. . ' r,'-«r •!
' '
* r ^ 'itj;'.’'
t ;> • ^ ’ ;.
'
*'
"/ r -•<''•
'
r.
“ ** ''
-
"
'vi.'Xii'-" rXenx ''•’ ;
’
'
•; " v't * tc .'
^
.: 'rr^'. fl(sr .Oii? V ’ ' . ^ J I. r "X
- 1 - . ^ i -OiiVJr vrr
'V
.
<'-‘•7 . f < ,. f »r *
''
'^ “tc ^ ' ! 'tr*
'
-jlr-j iriy, VC... IIIT , . 1 i-i::r; -P
*•: rc-'t •'^rx ••'r;!i 'T ..-ijR'^cir ‘‘'Ox/'
'tc'l '. ' •-
’•‘^ *
'''S
'
'] --''X-^nX
- C ^ r- n; t v^' ^ -roiiri^ =f/nocf
j: . ' ;
•
-7 'o 'V Qit rrcS^fnr r'c ' 'M:f.>:7
7"'
'10
!5Cf?’?i
'
-j* ’ <• TB'! ''. *. fC)l' C '
r
'• ; s'.'t, !; V oXj fifiXXicC
- 53-
by purchase, loan, or friendly negotiation. These methods
proving of little value, sterner measures were adopted.
A list of the wanted securities was published, and the
holders were required to turn the securities over to the
British Treasury, or pay an extra income tax on the
securities* earnings of 10 percent or two shillings on
the pound. The burden was made as light as possible.
The owners of the securities could either sell or lend.
If the latter, and as long as sale by the government was
unnecessary, they received not only their interest and
dividends but also ^ percent on the nominal value of the
securities in addition. The French Republic pursued a
bonus policy: compulsion v/as unnecessary
.
(1) If the
increase in genuine funds as a result of the above-mentioned
activities proves inadequate, further borrov/ing efforts by
the government may prove inflationary.
Inflation may be defined as an increase in the
means of payment sufficiently large as to cause in a short
time a rise in the general price level. (2) In fundamen-
tals the phenomenom of inflation are the same whether it
comes through the creation of government paper money or
the expansion of bank credit. The increase in purchasing
power measured in money units raises prices, rising prices
makes expenditures larger calling for an increase in the
rate at which paper is being issiied or bank credit is being
TTT Taussig, International Trade, page 318
(2) Ely, Outline of Economics . 5th edition, page 316.
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created.
From the study of the Civil and World wars it
was noticed that at the outset the government borrowed
heavily by means of short-term obligations. The utili-
zation of short-term instruments was quite necessary in
view of the fact that ordinary revenues of government
suffered greatly due to the derangement of business and
commerce; and, moreover it was impossible to raise la.rge
amounts of purchasing power by taxation or long-term
loans since time is required to prepare tax and loan
measures. Since the initial expenditure of the govern-
ment for war supplies is heavy, resort usually is had to
short-term obligations to secure the necessary funds.
Moreover, as it was observed that the government sells
its notes to the banks, there is an excellent opportunity
for inflation to start at this Juncture. The banks to
which the notes are sold find it impossible or are un-
willing to reduce their loans outstanding. In the first
instance, the banks must carry their customers who ex-
pect remittances from abroad; in the second, the banks
find it profitable to lend to those businesses stimulated
by war demands. If the Increase in credit is great enough,
there will be a rise in the general level of prices. From
April 1917 to August 1917, bank deposits in the United
States increased \2% and the general level of prices 40^. (1)
U) Ck>ldenweise, The Federal Reserve System in Operation,
page 50.
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Mr. Hawtry in his book Currency and Credit
argues in the following manner. "If" he says, '•con-
sumers' outlay does not decrease in proportion as they
lend to the government, there is a possibility of in-
flation." Continuing he says, "People who are expect-
ing heavy taxation, and who are led to believe that it
is their patriotic duty to reserve all the money they
can for the forthcoming long-term loans, are likely to
restrict their outlay not only on personal consumption,
but also on investment. There will be an immediate de-
crease in consumers' outlay to set against the immedi-
ate increase in government outlay for war purposes."
Mr. Hawtry suggests in his argument that Inflation v/ill
or will occur at the outset of a war depending on the
reaction of "consumers outlay". This may be the truth
of the matter in other countries, but it was the exper-
ience of the United States during the last war, that
the bank credit created by the sale of short-term ob-
ligations to the banks was sufficient to cause a rise
in the general price level. The error in Mr. Hawtry'
s
argument was the assumption that the sale of the short-
term obligations was directly to the public.
At the outset of a v;ar then, whether or not
there will be inflation depends on the magnitude of the
amount of credit created by the sale of the short-term
obligations to the banks. The credits established by
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the central banks will be imnedl8.tely drawn against,
either being transferred to other banks in the form of
credits, or paid away as notes. The central bank must
ever stand ready to pay its depositors in legal tender
and so must increase its note issue to any extent nec-
essary for the purpose. The checking against the bor-
rowed funds by the government swells the reserves of
other banks thus putting them in a position to lend
more. If the banks pursue a policy of expansion prices
will rise further.
During the World War due to the magnitude of
government borrowing operations the individual investors
in government bonds were unable to take them in large
quantities except with the aid of the banks. It v/as
the principal function of the federal reserve banks to
assist the Treasury in floating government securities.
At the conclusion of the war, the reserve banks had
discounted over two billions of paper for member banks
one and one-half billions of which was secured by govern-
ment obligations
. (1) A deposit credit with the reserve
banks can, if used entirely, be expanded to ten times
that amount through the banking system as a whole. For
this reason government borrowing activities may lead to
an of bank credit v/hich may be inflationary.
In the United States from 1913 to 1920 bank deposits in-
(1) Goldenweise, The Federal Reserve System in Operation .
page 30.
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creased from $12,750,000,000 to $31,948,000,000 while
the index of wholesale prices was up to 2.3. (1) From
these figi-ires it may be concluded that the increase
in bank deposits due to government borrowing activities
was in some part responsible for the inflation existing
during the period of 1913 to 1920. Returning to the
definition of inflation, “an increase in the means of
payment sufficient to cause in a short time a marked
rise in the general price level," it must be noted
that bank deposits, real or created, constitute the
main part of the “means of payment" in the United
States. Therefore, an Increase in deposits may prove
inflationary; and the increase during the last war
due to the floatation of government obligations did
have its effect in the general price level.
(l) Ely, Outline of Economics, page 312.
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CHAPTER 3
CX)VERNlffiNT PAPER MONEY
Government Paper Money During the Revolutionary War.
We have seen that it was almost impossible for
the Continental Congress to raise money by loans or taxa-
tion at the outset of the Revolution, Resort to govern-
ment paper money was therefore necessary. Almost the
first financial step of Congress after hostilities be-
gan was to vote an issue of paper money. On June 22,
1775, authority was given for an issue of $2,000,000 of
bills of credit based upon the credit of the States, and
with a careful apportionment of the amount each colony
should redeem between 1779-1782.(1) Between that date
and November 29, 1779, a period of about four years and
a half, forty of these emissions with a total issue of
$241,552,780 were authorized. “There is a strong possi-
bility that more was surreptitiously put out by the em-
barrassed treasury off icials , “ (2) No more were printed
after 1779, when Congress voted that the amount of bills
should not exceed $200,000,000,(3) Tabulated by years
the number of issues and the amounts authorized v/ere as
follows
:
(1) Dewey, Financial History of the United States
,
page 36
(2) Ibid
(3) Ibid
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Nuraber of
Year Issues Amounts
1775 3 $ 6,000,000
1776 4 19,000,000
1777 5 13,000,000
1778 14 63, 500,300
1779 14 140.052.480
Total 40 $241,552,780
In addition to the continental issues the States
put out $299,524,776 of paper notes. Of this sum more
than one-half ($128,441,000) was issued by Virginia alone;
$33,325,000 by North Carolina, ajid $33,458,926 by South
Carolina. (2)
The continental bills were of various denomina-
tions; in the first issue of 1775 it was voted that there
should be 49,000 bills of one, two, three, four, five,
six, seven, and eight dollars. In the next year Congress
authorized a considerable amount of small bills in notes
«
of fractional parts of a dollar. In later issues larger
denominations were printed, running as high as sixty-five
dollars. The first issues could not be supplied as rapid-
ly as needed, and it was found that the signing of the
notes would take more time than members could possibly
devote to the task; consequently, twenty-eight men were
named and compensated to be signers of the bills. Much
disorder was introduced by the counterfeiting of notes
both by English and Americans. (3)
(1) Dewey, Financial History of the United States, page 36
(2) Ibid, page 37
(3) Ibid, page 38
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So far as declarations went Congress was pro-
fuse; the pledge of the faith of Congress was early given,
and a method of redemption was recommended. The first
issue was put forth to meet the immediate emergency of
the war; the following issues were authorized as a last
resort because the States failed to contribute. In the
month following the first issue of bills of credit, Con-
gress asked each colony to provide ways and means to
sink its proportion of bills, and crudely apportioned
the responsibility among the States according to popu-
lation, including negroes. (l)
It was suggested that the payments be made in
four installments, beginning with November 30, 1779, and
that this could be brought about by the adoption of pro-
visions that the notes be receivable by the colonial
governments for State Taxes, and then be transferred to
Congress in payment of the amounts assigned to the sever-
al States. Again, upon the issue of $5,000,000, ordered
May 9, 1776, Congress voted that the thirteen colonies
be pledged for its redemption at such periods and in such
manner as Congress shall heres.fter direct. In a circular
"Letter of Congress to the Inhabitants, " in the autumn of
1779, solemn attention is directed to the fact that the
people had pledged their faith to redemption of the bills,
not only collectively through their representatives but
(1) Dewey. Financial History of the United States, page 37
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indiVidually. (1)
Congress itself did not declare these contin-
ental notes to he legal tender, but called upon the
States to devise the necessary legislation. “The recom-
mendation was more acceptable than the provision for
redemption, and it was generally enacted by the several
States that a refusal to accept the bills constituted an
extinguishment of the debt.” Closely allied with the
enactment of State legal-tender laws to give support to
the bills was the passage of resolutions in Congress in
denunciation of all persons who refused to receive bills. (2)
On November 23, 1775, such disloyal action v;as brought to
the attention of Congress, and a committee was appointed
to consider the matter. A report was submitted, and it
was resolved "That if 8.ny person shall be hereafter so
lost to all virtue and regard for his country as to re-
fuse such person shall be deemed an enemy
of his country. "(3)
With similar ends in view legislation v.'as
passed to enforce the regulation of prices when deprecia-
tion of the bills became most marked; "monopolizers and
engrossers were severely denounced; and after seeking to
punish by fine and imprisonment persons who should ad-
vance the price of commodities, the different States be-
gan to hold price conventions and attempt to fix the
prices of labor and commodities." The first of these
(1) Elliot, J.
,
Funding* System
, pages 6-16
(2) Ibid
(3) Ibid
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assemblages was held in Providence in December, 1776,
whereupon Congress recommended the plan to other States. (1)
Since all attempts to support the credit of the
bills failed, depreciation set in rapidly and was quickly
accelerated. According to Rajnsay, the people at first
received the bills willingly, and during the last months
of 1776 the depreciation was slight and gradual; "but
when the amount of the issues exceeded $200,000,000,
there was a point both in time and quantity beyond which
this congressional alchemy ceased to operate. (2) In 1779
the depreciation became very marked, and during that year
the values of the continental currency in specie on suc-
cessive dates may be seen from the following table.
1779 January 14, 8 to 1 1779 June 4, 20 to 1
• February 3, 10 " 1 September 17 24 " 1
April 2, 17 " 1 October 14 30 " 1
May 5, 24 " 1 November 17 38^" 1
(3)
Congress was slow to recognize officially that
there was depreciation, but finally, on March 18, 1780, it
made provision for the acceptance of paper in the place of
silver at the rate of 40 to 1. A tax of $15,000,000 a
month for thirteen months was levied on the states, to be
paid in bills of old emissions; these in turn were to be
destroyed and replaced by a nev/ issue not exceeding in
amount one-tv/entieth of the face value of the old issue.
(1) Dewey. Financial History of the United States, page 39
(2) Ramsay, D., On Depreciation of the Continental Currency
(3) Dewey, Financial History of the United States , page 39
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Six-tenths of the hills were to be paid to the States and
the rest retained for national purposes. The nev; bills
were to be redeemable in specie in five years and to be
receivable for taxes. Under the law $119,400,000 of
notes were paid in by the States and destroyed; of the
new authorized notes only $4,400,000 v/ere actually is-
sued. (1)
Congress also attempted to give some order to
the depreciation by resolving "that the value of the
bills when loaned shall be ascertained by computing these
on a progressive rate of depreciation commencing with
September 1, 1777, and continuing to March 18, 1780, in
geometrical progression and proportional to the time
from period to period, assuming the depreciation to be
as follows: (2)
"On March 1, 1778, 1.75 for one Spanish milled dollar
On Sept. 1, 1778 4. " " " " "
On March 1, 1779 18. " " " " "
On Marchl8, 1780 40 " " " " " "
Congress also at the time advised the states to
repeal the punitive legislation directed against those who
refused to receive bills.
The old continental currency after 1780 depreci-
ated more rapidly than ever. In 1781, it was valued at
100 to 1, and in May of that year it ceased to pass as
currency, but was afterguards bought and sold as an article
of speculation at from five hundred to one thousand to one.
(1) Dewey, Financial History of the United States , page 40
(2) Finance . V, 766
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“The final fate of the currency was inglorious. Under
the funding act of 1790 small amount of the notes were
received in subscription for stock; and of the |78,000-
000 then estimated to be outstanding only about $6,000-
000 were subscribed for stock. The remainder had been
probably lost or destroyed. “ (1)
The study of government paper money during
the H evolutionary war emphasizes strongly the need for
care in issuing fiat money since an excessive use of
this tool of finance may lead to a marked depreciation
of the currency. If, as was seen at the start of the
war, the issues are not excessive, people will have
confidence in the money and use it freely; there will
be no dgreciation. When, however, the issues become
excessive, and there is no means provided for their
redemption in specie, the currency deteriorates greatly
in value due to the citizen *s lack of faith in the cur-
rency. They refuse to accept the currency, and it is not
long before the unit dwindles to almost nothing in value.
To keep paper money on par with its specie value a mech-
anism for redemption must be established, for by that
means only can the paper be kept at par v;ith the specie.
The lesson be drawn from the study is that a govern-
ment should/ybe too willing to grossly inflate its curren-
cy with irredeemable paper money. Price fixing by legis-
lation and pledges of faith are poor substitutes for the
confidence of the people.
(l) Dewey, Financial History of the United States, page 42
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Government Paper Money During; the Civil War .
The act of February 25, 1862, provided for
the issue of $150,000,000 of legal- tender United States
notes in denomination of not less than $5. The act says
nothing as to time of repayment of the legal tender
notes and makes no pledge against further issue. (l)
The first step was soon repeated; in little
more than three months, because of the inability of the
government to borrow, and the tardy effect of new taxes,
Secretary Chase asked for another issue of legal tenders,
a part of which should be in denominations of less than
five dollars. Congress quickly assented by the act of
July, 11, 1862, providing for the issue of another
$150,000,000, of which $35,000,000 should be in denomina-
tions of less than five dollars but not less than one
dollar. On January 17, 1863, a third issue of $100,000-
000 was authorized, increased in March 3, to $150,000,000
all of which might be in denominations of one dollar or
over. Provision was made for the reissue of the notes.
Of the $450,000,000 authorized under the acts named,
$431,000,000 was actually outstanding June 30, 1864,
This was the end of the emissions of non-interest legal-
tender notes; these issues were supplemented by fraction-
al currency and Interest bearing notes running for a
brief period, both of which classes were endowed with
(1) Dates & figures from: Hockett, Political and Social
History of the United States .
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legal- tender qualities.
The first two issues of legal-tender notes v;ere
fundable within five years at the option of the holders
into 6 percent gold bonds; this privilege was an indirect
method of redeeming the notes by turning them into the
most valuable and best protected form of government in-
debtedness founded on a specie support. Within a year,
however, Chase objected to the option thus given to the
holder of the note on the ground ths.t it restricted the
sale of bonds. Obviously it would be impossible to
sell bonds bearing a lower rate of interest so long as 6 per-
cent bonds could be had through the funding of legal-
tender notes. In view of his objections the act of
March 3, 1863, made no provision for conversion of the
third series of legal tenders, and even changed the con-
tract expressed in the previous issues by requiring that
the right to exchange notes already issued for bonds
should be exercised before July 1, of that year.(l)
In December, 1861, specie payments were sus-
pended. It was due to the lack of public confidence
in the success of the war. Military reverses, the
Trent affair with England, and the wavering policy of
the Treasury all conspired to decrease public confidence.
It was impossible to sell bonds to investors, people were
withdrawing funds for hoarding, specie reserves were melt-
ing away. It finally became impossible to meet demands
for coin,
(1) Dewey, Financial History of the United States
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The two most distinct consequences of the suc-
cessive issues of legal- tender notes were; the rise of
prices of commodities; and the fluctuating premium on
gold. The depreciation of the currency in terms of gold
is seen in the following' table. (The avers-ge gold price
Hoo1
—
1
o currency.
)
Month 1862 1863 1864 1865
Jan. $ 98 $ 69 $ 64 $ 46
Feb. 97 62 63 49
March 98 65 62 57
April • 98 66 58 67
May 97 67 57 74
June 94 69 47 71
July 87 77 39 70
August 87 79 39 70
Sept
.
84 74 45 69
Oct
.
78 68 48 69
Nov. 76 68 43 68
Dec. 76 66 44 68 (1)
The other index of depreciation is found in the
general rise of prices; this cannot be alone attributed to
the issue of paper currency; other factors were at work,
such as increased taxation and the Insatiable consumption
of provisions and materials of war. "We cannot take the
premium on gold as measuring the difference between actual
prices and the prices v/hich would have existed if the coun-
try had remained on a gold basis, for the premium varied
sharply from day to day, according to the progress of the
v/ar, the movements of foreign trade, or the manipulations
of the speculators; while the changes in price moved slug-
(1) Dewey, Financial History of the United States , page 293
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gishly. When allowance is made for all the special fact-
ors there is an undoubted rise in general prices which
can only be accounted for by the existence of a large
volume of depreciated currency. "(1)
True to the general law that wages of labor do
not respond to economic forces as promptly as the prices
of commodities, a glance at the following chiart shows
that the depreciated value of the money medium during
the Civil War was not reflected in an equal measure by
irease in money wages.
Year Prices Money Wages
1860 100 100
1861 100.6 100.8
1862 127.8 102.9
1863 148.6 110.5
1864 190.5 125.6
1865 216.8 143.1 (2)
Another important consequence of the suspension
of specie payments was the fluctuating premium on gold
caused by the demand for specie as a commodity. Gold was
required in large quantities for three purposes: by the
government for payment of interest on bond issues; by im-
porters to pay customs duties; by bankers to settle bal-
ances abroad. The stock of gold in the country in 1861 was
not large, and was speedily lessened by the extension of
paper issues and by unfavorable balances of tr8.de, due to
the sale of American securities by foreign holders and the
(1) Dewey, Financial History of the United States , page 293.
(2) "Aldrich Report”.
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decline in exports. During 1862 the fluctuations in
the quotation of gold in paper currency range between
102 and 132; in 1863 betv/een 125 and 160; and in 1864
betv/een 125 and 285.(1) The political and economic
factors which caused these changes according to Mr. Wes-
ley C. Mitchell are as follows;
“First, the Increase in the amount of greenbacks,
as for example, reflected in the rapid rise of the pre-
mium after July 11, 1862, the date of the second legal
tender act; secondly, the condition of the treasury as
disclosed from time to time by the secretary's report;
thirdly, the credit of the government from week to week
as shown in the quotations of its bonds; fourthly,
changes in the personnel of the government; fifthly,
the state of the foreign relations of this country;
sixthly, the war news and fluctuations between hope and
discouragement consequent upon military success or de-
feat. “(2)
“Purely speculative Influences also played an im-
portant part in the variations of the premium. “(3) In
order to provide a market for the purchase and sale of
gold, an exchange v;as opened in New York, and the legiti-
mate dealings executed there were quickly supplemented
by the gambling of speculators. “So open was the trading,
virtually in public credit, that it constituted in the
(1) Dewey, Financial History of the United States
, p. 295
(2) The Q-reenbacks and the dost of the Civil War.
(3) Spaulding, C.Q-.
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minds of many a public scandal. It became the accepted
belief that the evil of fluctuation was due to the un-
patriotic criminal efforts of speculators and probably
secret enemies to raise the price of gold regardless of
the injury inflected on the country' (1)
Various methods were consequently enacted to
check and even stop this form of trading. A tax was
placed (March 3
,
1863) upon time- sales of gold; and
loans upon coin for security for more than its par value
even prohibited. Chase also experimented with selling
exchange upon London at a rate below market, but this
proved a failure. Finally June 17, 1864, a "gold bill"
to prevent v/agers in the price of gold was enacted.
This act declared unlawful any contract to purchase or
sell gold to be delivered on any day subsequent to the
making of the contract; it also forbade the purchase or
the sale of foreign exchange to be delivered at any time
beyond ten days subsequent to the making of the contract;
or the making of any contract for the sale or delivery of
gold coin or bullion of which the person making the con-
tract v/as not at the time in possession of the gold. The
failure of such legislation was soon realized. The fluc-
tuations in the premium during the next few days was
rapid.
(1) Holies, vol.lii, p. 142.
(2) Dewey, Financial History of the United States
, p. 142.
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June 18 95 to 95i
20 98 II 98^
21 99i » 108
22 105 II 135
23 105 II 125
24 110 II 117
25 112 II 120
27 130 II 140
28 130 II 140
29 140 II 150
30 140 II 151
July 1 125 II 185
2 130 II 150
5 140 II 149 (1)
The situation in New York became Intolerable;
rushed upon Congress; and the law was repealed
ifteen days after its passage. From this time
on, in spite of the rapid fluctuations, the range of de-
preciation was held in check; no more legal tenders were
issued beyond the $450,000,000 authorized under the three
acts, and the military successes v/hich occurred during
the summer of 1864 presaged an end of the war. (2)
Though the war ended soon ai'ter the repeal of
the bill, it was not until December 17, 1878, that paper
currency was once again quoted at par with Specie. (3)
During the intervening period the government pursued a
vacillating policy with the resiilt that depreciation of
the currency continued. In March, 1877, John Sherman
of Ohio was appointed secretary of the treasury. Sherman’s
policy was one of gold accumulation, the gold to be used to
redeem the outstanding notes as they were presented.
(1) Dewey, Financial History of the U.S .. p. 310.
(2) Ibid. p. 311
(3) Ibid. p. 376.
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There were many obstacles in the way of his policy; but
in spite of these obstacles, Sherman persisted in his
policy. He concluded that 40 percent of the notes was
th smallest safe reserTe of gold; on this basis $138,000-
000 in coin was necessary. On January 1, 1879, the treas-
ury had gathered together $133,000,000 of coin over and
above all matured liabilities. To do this $95,500,000
of bonds were sold, the balance being met from surplus
revenue. Slowly but gradually the value of the notes
approached parity with gold, and on December 17, 1878
paper currency was quoted at par.(l)
The following table shows the average annual
value in gold of $100 in currency during the entire period
of suspension.
Fiscal
Year
Value Fiscal
Year
Value
1863 $72.9 1871 $88.7
1864 64.0 1872 89.4
1865 49.5 1873 87.3
1866 71.2 1874 89.3
1867 70.9 1875 88.4
1868 71.5 1876 87.8
1869 72.7 1877 92.7
1870 81.1 1878 97.5 (2)
It is to be observed that in the actual carrying
out of resumption there was no contraction v/hatever in
paper currency. Very little paper money was presented for
gold, and whatever came in was paid out again for immediate
use. $346,681,000 are still outstanding. (3)
(1) Dewey, Financial History of the United States , page 374
(2) Ibid, page 376
(3) Ibid, page 377
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We have seen from our study of government paper
money during the Civil War that if convertibility into
specie is not a fact, marked depreciation of the currency
in terms of specie sets in almost immediately. After
convertibility, the last obstacle in the v/ay of inflation,
is removed, the value of the currency takes its value
from the confidence of the people in the government which
issues it. We saw that confidence is very sensitive
to changes in the government's fortunes. in war and to any
administrative weaknesses on the part of the government.
These changes in confidence are reflected in the fluctua-
tion of the gold premium seen in the chart on the next
page. From the above it may be concluded that suspension
of specie payments should be avoided but, if this is im-
possible, every effort should be made by the government
to preserve the people’s confidence. A rapidly fluctuat-
ing standard of value Increases v;ar costs and milita.tes
against successful treasury operations. Moreover, specu-
lation is liable to become rampant.
The war government made a huge mistake in not
providing for resumption immediately upon the close of
the war. The same evils mentioned above are present in
a post-v/ar period. We have noticed that in the post-war
resumption there was no contraction of currency, but
merely a strong, direct policy of gold accumulation.
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From this it may be concluded that, if a government
shov/s vigor and good faith, confidence,
able effect upon the value of currency.
with its favor-
is stimulated.
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The Issue of Government Notes In the World War.
During the World War the United States issued
no government non-interest-bearing legal tender notes:
in fact, the float that remained over from the Civil War
was reduced from $343,000,000 in 1913 to $339,000,000
in 1920.(1) Bank notes, hov/ever, Increased from $726,-
000,000 in 1913 to $4,017,000,000 in 1920. In our pre-
sent banking system, however, the amount of bank notes
is a function of the amount of bank deposits; that is,
the main means of payment is by means of checks against
deposits, notes are used only for "hand-to-hand” cur-
rency. People must have pocket money to make the rou-
tine daily purchases; employers have to make payroll
payments, so in the tv>ro cases deposits are checked against
for these purposes. An increase in bank notes means,
therefore, that bank deposits are becoming greater which,
in turn, v;ould suggest that necessary expenditure is in-
creasing. People borrow usually to finance their working
capital requirements or, as we saw in the World War, to
enable themselves to invest in government obligations.
The increase in the latter type of borrowing was seen to
have proved inflationary. This hand-to-ha,nd currency may
depreciate markedly if the banking system does not stand
ready to redeem it in its legislated specie value. During
the World War there was no suspension of specie payments.
(1) Ely, Outline of Economics, page 312.
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Therefore there were no spasmodic fluctuations in the
value of the currency unlt,^^^but merely the general and
steady rise in prices resulting from the increase in the m
means of payment. (1) Other countries were not so for-
tunate. In G-erraany suspension occurred, hut the banks
continued to issue notes in great amounts until by
September 1924 the paper marks in circulation reached
the meaningless total of $1,500,000 with fifteen addi-
tional ciphers. (2) This utter discredit of the currency
will also occur when a government does not stand ready
to redeem its issues of legal tenders, but continues to
issue them in profusion. In Russia the paper circula-
tion (government notes had to be expressed in quadrillions (3)
In both cases the paper money was not tied to anything of
relatively fixed value such as specie; they depended for
their value upon the confidence of the people in the gov-
ernment. When confidence was shattered the notes became
worthless. The indices of inflation during the period of
1913 to 1920 in the two countries was: G-ermany, 14.9;
Russia, 12.(4)
Though the United States escaped such a dis-
astrous experience, it is to be recognized that the pos-
sibility exists. Efforts should be made, if a future
emergency arises, to avoid such a catastrophic situation.
fl) Ely, Outline of Economics, page 312.
(2) Ibid
(3) Ibid
(4) Ibid
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The following table shows the inflation which occurred
during the last war in various countries participating
in the conflict. It also shows how the inflation was
brought about.
INFLATION DURING AND AFTER THE WORLD WAR (1)
Commercial Whole-
Country Monetary
Unit
Government
Notes
1913 1920
Bank Notes Bank De- sale
posits Prices
1913 1920 1913 1920
France Franc — — 5,174 37,902 5,977 750 5.1
Italy Lira 499 ^545 2,545 2,283 2,951 25,781 6.3
United King. Pound — 368 35 119 7,071 2,549 3.1
German Mark 144 316 6,083 81,071 9,642 83,891 1419
Canada $ 160 251 105 229 1,067 2,136 2.5
United States $ 343 339 726 12,75012,750 31,148 2.3
Figures in Millions
(1) Ely, Outline of Economics
,
page 312.
A ^
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CHAPTER IV
INFLATION
History would seem to teach that wars of any
great magnitude are accompanied by inflation. From the
study of the three great conflicts participated in by
the United States, we saw evidences of inflation. In the
United States the index of inflation in 1920 was 2.5; dur-
ing the Civil War average prices shov/ed an advance of
2.2, though no index of inflation is available, there
is no doubt as to inflation during the Revolutionary War.
We have seen how government fiscal activities may bring
about inflation; and, moreover, inflation ma.y result
Just as easily from an increase in bank credit as from
Issues of legal-tender notes. It was evident from our
study that inflation may be dangerous.
If the issues of paper money or the creation
of bank credit become too profuse, the government or
the banks may find it impossible to meet demands for
specie. In this situation and in the situation where
convertibility has not been provided for the currency
unit depends for its value upon the confidence of the
people in the government. Since confidence is very
changeable, a state of affairs exists wherein the value
of the currency unit fluctuates violently. This fluc-
tuation has its adverse effects both on a government’s
financial attempts and on business in general. All at-
nr Monthly Report of the Bureau of Labor. Wholesale
Prices . August. 1920 .
r/T-
/ it
'•
JIQITAJ'^a
3 5'
XfWB 1«
« ?
"&0’V
\:-i .:l I'--'-' ir-: .' ^i^'
. r
' ?.
•
.
;.•/ Ou-ll . : ..
O r.r
r- ]\c: '
,
' r j. V v ifi?
<
*
;''X.;-| .m ft
''t
"J ill'll'.'
3 '
'*
• ". J
."/'
-kjC b^'., J,
'^....1 K^'ni 3*1-*
'
• • j • Ic •? T ' '‘i: p.?»' i -i c ' rfo
'
'. Tv jt
I'*ni r.- sn ,'
tR /'x:;":, I :. \I'^ir i oi rit* Tduob --'R <*1
".fii'i-j' v.Ho' ,!• ; V ? T-:; . I cni":
'
“^
.-
. .n^ * V.
h
* ’0;'
.
3^3 ' '
• •;
:
‘u 'M ^i' .!%&- ’.y'lz.K* “'•5'^
, e--- -^^f-rhi:* - r 'Xc- 'd y^sB^
'.
•--
^
•-: rtr' ^•; 'xl'C.V.r ' ' >v<^ xbUc?
'\i x.rv- -• r -• lo eoiR'ia/
•(c 1 n %‘i\
'
''
' ., *'a£.»TrC’t'’ *'T 'o*'0 .:'2i;*t t-; Ic
.V
V, j 't'.i-C: '
”
'”fvJ 1*5 j;. V'. — li .' OriJ
^ ,1 |
_
-*•
b.. • .’ :-V- :C .o.lov-JS
n*f;r o'x: ';;- -; - f .•- 'r. v T^Iidi-tT % -
; ", r-i3X,X^:-"' ^i'-" nc’Ciy ic't 5X»f: ‘j: r
r-
-. -
-.v • .'.
'
onn.;, :/! •' . -
"
- ni "Icoo';
'' i r’;C/5*i* ?i' i- ': ^ .v-X; X'
v:--, 2v.^'
-". •' :'rr3 *^0
;-/OV, RO /?od 3 ^ ^ ' X’'. ' ' *i: ' 'i .10^1
.
nl :-£5.'T.Ux;d' JK» .:«/ ''.'rj.r.X'i
r * f ; f/ " ”
V 1
- 79-
terapts at price control prove futile being a poor sub-
stitute for people's confidence. All during the period,
speculation will be rife, especially speculation in the
currency unit in terras of gold as v/e saw during the
Civil War. Speculation in a currency is peculiarly dan-
gerous in that it brings about its own fulfillraent.
Those who expect a continuance of inflation hasten to
becorae debtors in the depreciating currency or atterapt
to secure real assets. In the first place, if the de-
raands for funds are raet the Increase raises prices further;
in the second place, the Increased deraand for assets raise
their value in terms of the currency unit, thus raising
prices.
Marked depreciation may become a source of
discredit and militate against borrowing at home or
abroa,d. The gravity of this evil depends on how much
a country is dependent on foreign borrov/lng to carry on
a war. In the Civil and World wars the government was
not dependent on foreign borrowing; but during the Rev-
olutionary War the government found borrowing abroad
most difficult due to the depreciation of the currency.
During the Civil War, however, the government found at
many times that it was quite difficult to institute a
successful borrowing program.
The social consequences of currency discredit
-
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are many but a discussion of them is outside the scope
of this paper. Suffice it to say that for the most
part they are evil. For this reason complete deprecia-
tion of the currency should be avoided because of its
harmful effects upon the morale of the people.
Utter discredit of the currency is the excep-
tion to the rule rather than the rule. During the World
War only a small proportion of the warring nations ex-
perienced its evils. (1) In the United States complete
discredit occurred only in the Revolutionary War. How-
ever, the possibility of its occurrence should be recog-
nized and guarded against in the future.
Do evils alone attend the existence of infla-
tion or does inflation work some good? Should inflation
be avoided during a period of conflict? The answer is
’•No” with some qualifications. Inflation either by
means of government legal-tender notes or a creation of
bank credit due to government borrowing transfer purchas-
ing power to the government directly through the increase
of the medium of exchange and indirectly through a price
rise. In the latter respect it differs from loans and
taxation coming from the genuine savings of the people.
The transfer by inflation is concealed; it is a forced
loaji from the people. Any attempt to show how this trans-
fer is effected must Involve a discussion of the theory of
(1) Ely, Outline of Economics , page 314.
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“Forced Savings"
.
(1) "Forced Savings" occurs whenever
there is s.n increase in the stream of money directed on
the market. The competition of this new money prevents
•
certain persons from consuming goods which ordinarily
they would have consumed were there no rise in prices.
The persons who undergo this process consume less than
they intended so their consumption is below their cur-
rent output. This increase in new money decreases the
value of their money stocks since the value per unit is
decreased due to the increase of money. The result is
that the holders of money stocks decrease their consump-
tion still more in order to keep the value of their
stocks at their former levels. Therefore, the competi-
tion of the government’s new money prevents consumption
thus transferring goods and services to the government.
So then in this respect inflation may prove a boon to a
government. Another argument for inflation has to do with
its stimulating effect upon businesses. When prices are
rising steadily there is a chance for large profits; this
possibility for profits stimulates production along all
lines; and those goods which the government needs are
readily forthcoming. Inflation is like a dose of stimu-
lant; its effects are not restricted to the entrepreneur
alone but the ordinary v/orker is stimulated to his ma.xi-
(l) The material for the discussion of "Forced Savings"
was gathered from Professor Pigou’s article of the
same name in the Q.J.E., October, 1923.
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raum productive effort. Money wages mount mightily, but
not real wages. This increase in wages has a very stim-
ulating effect upon the worker. A maximum productive
effort on the part of a nation's industries is essential
to the welfare of a nation during a period of conflict.
It has been stated that inflation stimulates all indus-
tries. At this point heavy pressure is exerted on the
country's resources in competition with the government's
war needs: Resources are spilt into the ground. The
government should step in and control all the non-essen-
tial industries: imports can be restricted, manufactur-
ers capital issues in non-essential industries can be
controlled.
During the last war England stopped the sub-
scription to new securities. The English market had
in a single year during the decade preceding 1914 in-
vested as much as $1,337,000,000 in all sorts of secur-
ities, home and foreign. In the whole of 1914 its total
subscriptions to new securities amounted to $3,542,000-
000, but only $76,000,000 of that sum was placed in or-
dinary investment enterprises. The remainder was made
up of British war loans for war purposes. (l)
To stop people's consumption, the principal
articles of consumption can be controlled and rationed
(1) Noyes, A., Financial Chapters of the World War .. p. 53.
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by the government. In a discussion of inflation its
stimulating effect upon industry must be recognized
as a distinct aid to a government during a period of
war. However, it is essential that the non-essential
industries be controlled. Mr. J. M. Keynes is a sup-
porter of inflation aS/^^necessity during a war when he
says, "To finance a war some degree of inflation is
necessary. The initial effect of an inflation policy
would be that the purchasing power released would not
accrue immediately to the government but to the pro-
ducers in the shape of exceptional profits. Thus the
traders would become the collecting agents for the gov-
ernment. The government would have the choice of tak-
ing it from them by loans or taxes. The main purpose
of inflation is defeated if incomes rise as high as
prices. "(1) Here is another argument for inflation in
time of v;ar. Mr. Keynes bases his v/hole argument on the
discrepancy which occurs between v/ages and profits dur-
ing a period of rising prices; the former being notori-
ously "sticky". Mr Keynes sees in an inflation period
the possibility of increased revenues for the government
in the shape of profits and excess-profits taxes.
In respect to inflation, we have noticed its
dangers and its advantages. Inflation ceases to be of
any aid to a government if it causes the currency unit
(l) Keynes. J.M. Treatise on Money. Vol.II, p. 246
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to depreciate markedly for then its disadvantages com-
pletely outweigh its advantages. Every possible attempt
must be made to control inflation. This of course means
that the inflation must not lead to suspension, for sus-
pension is the last barrier in the way of the vicious
spiral of inflation which has its end in complete dis-
credit of the currency. After considering the advantages
and dangers of inflation, it is to be concluded that in-
flation during a large-scale war may be indispensable,
both in its stimulating effect on industry and as a
source of purchasing power; but inflation is a dangerous
instrument of v;ar finance, The government must do all in
its power to control the inflation.
The return to peace advances the question of a
remedy for an Inflated currency. The post-war situation
differs radically from the war situation. War exigencies
mitigate or at any rate mask the worst effects of infla-
tion. "Inflation is essentially Inflation of consumers’
outlay; but during wartime people can in various ways be
limited in their expenditures. "(1) The result is that
surplus money can find no resting place except in govern-
ment obligations. When the tension of war is relaxed,
the restrictions are resented, and, if retained, are evaded. (2)
When peace brings comparative freedom to spend, money is
spent rapidly thus causing the velocity of circulation to
(1) Hawtrey, R.
,
Currency and Credit , page 98.
(2) Ibid, page 120.
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increase. Unless the government reduces some of Its
floating debt or its issues of legal tenders, unless
the banks pursue a 'policy of contraction, further in-
flation will result. "Here we reach a very critical
stage, for there is the possibility of very disastrous '
inflation. If inflation really takes hold, nothing
can be done until the budget is on its way to being
balanced. The balancing should be as far as possible
by means of revenue and economy in expenditure. The
price the government v;ill have to pay for loans will
be too high. " (1)
An observer of post-war economic conditions
in G-ermany set down his observations of that chaotic
period as follows:
"All during this uncertain period
speculation was running rife. The people hastened to
become debtors in the depreciating currency; and, since
the banks continued to lend, more credit was created
which caused further depreciation of the currency. When
there was the possibility of appreciation of the curren-
cy, people hesitated to become indebted, and there was a
contraction of bank credit which increased the value of
the unit. The currency being in this unstable condition,
people speculated in its relation to commodities and for-
_
Leaf, Banking: page 133
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elgn currencies. The rushes to buy and sell magnified
the appreciation and depreciation of the currency unit.
That was why the collapse of the discredited currency
was not steady and continuous but was broken by wild
and spasmodic fluctuations. It is interesting to note
the Interest rates charged by banks during that wild
period. In the autumn of 1922, advances were made at
the rate of 20^a month. This apparently exhorbitant
rate measured the extend of the distrust felt by the
public. Eventually, when the collapse of the currency
reached its climax in 1923, the interest rate on mark
loans rose to 5, 10, and even 20 percent a day.“(l)
The picture presented shows graphically what was and
might be the final fate of a currency which was grossly
inflated during a war. That the post-v/ar period is
peculiarly dangerous must be remembered.
What alternatives exist for a government v/hose
currency has been inflated during a war? In main there
are three alternatives: deflation, complete repudiation,
partial repudiation. By deflation is meant an arbitrary
or planned decrease in the volume of the medium of ex-
change accompanied by falling prices. (2) The most import-
ant objective in view is the restoration of a stable mone-
tary unit and standard with the advantages such a standard
gives in domestic and foreign trade. Du.rlng the swing of
TTT Angell, J.W., The Recovery of Germany
.
1929
(2) Ely, Outline of Economics
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a business cycle in ordinary times, a lapse from parity
is corrected by factors leading to a contractions of
credit. The situation caused by a state of v/ar is differ-
ent in that the contraction comes mainly from the repay-
ment of government indebtedness to the banks. The char-
acter of the depression is the same. "The contraction
of the government’s indebtedness contracts the consumer's
outlay in much the same manner as does an equal amount of
trade borrowing contraction. " (1) All during this re-
covery period, the government must raise money for its
expenditures. If deflation is to be successful, these
funds must come from the genuine savings of the communi-
ty. Taxation and loans from genuine savings aid the de-
flation movement by reducing the expenditures of consumers.
"The portion of consumers' outlay which goes to the govern-
ment becomes, through government expenditure, consumers'
income to suffer further diminution at the hands of the
government (2) Demand, both government and consumers,
is reduced; orders to producers decrease; stocks accumu-
late; production comes to a standstill since profits are
minimized and finally v;iped out by falling prices. De-
flation requires a tremendous fiscal effort. As the de-
pression spreads, the yield from taxes falls off greatly;
to some extent government expenditure does likewise. But
(1) Hawtrey, Currency and Credit, page 172
(2) Ibid, page 174.
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the debt charges, which will constitute a large part of
government expenditures, are fixed in terms of the cur-
rency unit. "After the World War, the government pur-
sued an immediate contraction policy with the result
that the index of prices fell from 2.5 in May 1920 to
1.4 in January 1922. "(1) During the period follov/ing
the Civil War contraction or convertibility of the gov-
ernment legal tenders v/as postponed until many years af-
ter the war. The result was a currency unit fluctuat-
ing spasmodically as may be seen by a glance at the
chart showing the changes in the gold premium. It was-
n't until 1878 that business finaj.ly felt the advantages
of a stable monetary unit, for it was during that year
that the currency attained parity with gold.
"If a given amount of contraction must be under-
taken, the more quickly the better. undertaking an
immediate contraction policy the smallAis the loss to
production and labor. The gains made during the period
of war activity are consolidated."
( 2 )
The second course open to a government in re-
spect to its Inflated medium of exchange is complete re-
pudiation of the obligations. The obstacles to complete
deflation may be insurmountable; a return to a pre-war
standard would be Impossible. After the Revolutionary
War the Continental issues were redeemed at the rate of
(1) Dewey, Financial History of the United States, p. 90
(2) Fly, R., Outline 0 ^ Rcononics, nrg° 315.
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100 to 1. “There was not enough gold or silver to make
redemption a possibility. “ (l) In Germany, after the
old Reichsmark had dwindled in value, it was replaced
by a new mark at a ratio of a billion to one. (2) Com-
plete repudiation, if it comes while the depreciated
currency retains any value at all, is itself equivalent
to taxation so imposed that it falls as a direct burden on
those who hold money or credits payable in money. To com-
pletely repudiate obligations when there is still value
is to destroy confidence in the repudlator which in turn
may have its adverse effects upon subsequent governmental
fiscal endeavors. Confidence in the government will be
destroyed.
A third alternative, partial-repudiation of
obligations, is by far more common than complete repudia-
tion. (3) Partial repudiation occurs v/hen the banks or
government redeem their obligations at a discount or in
a monetary unit reduced in gold value. This new gold
value usually approximates the market value of the unit;
that is, the depreciation of the unit is recognized and
a new specie value is set up, the decreased value re-
flecting the depreciation. The currency unit preserves
its identity in that all debts remain virtually un-
changed, but the specie value of the debts is decreased.
Though there have been no examples of partial
(1) Dewey, Financial History of the United States , p. 90
(2) Ely, Outline of Economics , p. 315
(3) Dewey, Financial History of the United States , p. 650
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repudiation of obligations during the three wars studied,
in 1933, under the authorization of the Thomas Amendment
to the Agricultural Reconstruction Act, the price of gold
was advanced to $35 an ounce. By the old standard gold
was valued at $20.67 per ounce; this new gold price re-
presented a reduction of the gold content of the dollar
from 25.8 grains to 15 5/21 grains. (1) France after the
last war redeemed its paper money at about one-fifth its
pre-v/ar gold parity. (2) The above-mentioned are the al-
ternatives, but the choice of one of the alternatives is
a problem of no small magnitude.
The right policy with respect to deflation or
repudiation had to be determined in the light of the actu-
al political and economic circumstances existing at the
time. Thus where the amount of depreciation is small,
and consequently the degree of deflation to be undertaken
is not large, the restoration of the old monetary stand-
ard is to be desired. But if restoration is going to have
bad effects either economic or social, great care must be
taken in following the selected course of action. England,
in true British manner decided, after the last war, to
fulfill all its obligations by a return to pre-v;ar parity.
This decision, as later events proved, was one of the main
reasons for the disruption of her foreign trade. To sta-
(1) Dewey, Financial History of the U.S .. page 550.
(2) Ely, Outline of Economics
,
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billze at too high a level causes a drop in the domestic
price level. When Great Brits.in stabilized at ^4.866
instead of, say $4.50, a shipment of British goods quoted
at h 1,000 cost in dollars $4,866 Instead of $4,500.
Naturally this fact made it more difficult for British
exporters to sell abroad. Suppose that, before the pound
was stabilized, the British exporter had been getting the
business in competition with American and German export-
ers by offering a given quantity of goods for ^1,000 or
$4,500. If after stabilization, he continued to accept
$4,500 he v/ould receive in British currency only ii925.
This might be insufficient to cover his costs. A reduc-
tion of wages follows in an attempt to meet foreign com-
petition. A continuance of a depression may occur due
to the dropping of the price level. The above is only
one of the dangers which must be guarded against in post-
war currency activities.
The next chapter will be devoted to a summary
of the conclusions drawn from the study of the govern-
mental activities during our three greatest conflicts.
(1) Material from: Modern Economic Society , by S.K.
Schllcter. page 785.
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CHAPTER 5
SUMIJIARY OF CONCLUSIONS
Successful war-finance endeavors presupposes
the existence of a strong government v/hose powers are un-
questioned and whose dems.nds will be met. In the respon-
sible positions, men of proved ability and with the will
to pursue a correct course despite criticism should be
placed. Successful financiering is more a probability
if these conditions exist.
At the outset of a war increased taxation
should be immediately applied: in the first place, a
vigorous tax program has a stimulating effect upon peo-
ple's confidence in the government; in the second place,
resort to the more expensive tools of finance is less
intensive; and in the third place, people believe that
the imposition and submission to increased taxation is
their patriotic duty. At the outset of a war, the emer-
gency should not be considered temporary but rather,
tax bills should be so arranged as to provide for an
emergency of long duration. When the danger passes,
then tax bills may be scaled dov/n.
It is impossible to finance a large-scale v;a.r
mainly by the proceeds of taxation, but there is more
room for the exploitation of taxation during a war than
people admit of. Taxation must ever be considered in the
light of its effect on national income for there is a
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polnt beyond which taxation will adversely affect nation-
al income. During a war it is the government’s problem
to find that point. Increased taxation has its effects
on individual prices only, that is, if governments demand
is concentrated on a relatively small range of commodi-
ties; this demand raises those prices.
Borrowing at home or abroad is almost impossi-
ble if government credit is in any way grossly impaired,
for a government obligation is only as good as the gov-
ernment which issues it. Any factor which destroys con-
fidence in a government destroys the value of the govern-
ments’s obligations. Just as in a taxing program, a de-
finite policy must be adopted v;ith respect to borrowing.
When the demand for government obligations is small since
the return from them is relatively little as compared to
other securities, the interest rate should be raised.
Funds must be secured despite the increased cost. During
a war a government's financial activities must not be
such that they will hurt the business man who produces
those commodities essential to the government. That
bonds do not sell at par should not deter the government
from selling them, since in the next loan bill provisions
may be inserted which will make for a par or near-par
sale. In the sale of obligations no source of funds
should be overlooked, for the popularization of investment
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in government obligations is a policy to be pursued in
the future. Too much relia.nce should not be placed on
short-term obligation for herein lies an element of
danger. The obligations maturing during a war may ser-
iously embarrass a government which is in the market
for funds. The use of short-term obligations at the
start of a war is absolutely necessary since loan and
tax bills require some time for their preparation and
funds must be immediately forth coming. This use of
short-term obligations may or may not prove inflation-
ary depending on the reaction of bank credit during
the period. A strong banking system may be of great
aid to a government in the floatation of obligations,
as was seen during the World War.
The aid furnished the government by the
banks may possibly be inflationary due to the increase
in bank credit. Issues of government paper money with
no provisions for convertibility usually are inflation-
ary in their effects. Though there are many evils at-
tendant to the existence of inflation such as: the
possibility of speculation while the currency unit is
unstable in value and marked depreciation of the cur-
rency unit; a controlled inflation during a war has
its advantage, namely, in its stimulating effect on
production. But in a situation v/here inflation brings
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suspension and suspension brings a dwindling in value of
the currency unit, the disadvantages of inflation com-
pletely outweigh its advantages. A government in collab-
oration with the banks must do all in its power to control
inflation.
The post-war period is particularly dangerous
in a country whose currency has been grossly inflated,
since the restrictions on expenditure maintained during
the war are relaxed; and, if not relaxed, are evaded.
During this period a currency may go from bad to worse
if a government does not choose some sort of deflation
policy immediately. In main there are three alternatives:
which alternative is chosen should depend on the economic
and financial conditions then existing. Delay in choice
may make for catastrophe.
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